I honestly don’t even know what “true” means anymore :(.
Is mathematics typographical?
Are we just saying a string of symbols is “true” to kickstart our theory?

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- Yes. That's correct.
– insipidintegrator Nov 29 '23 at 12:34 -
2I like to take the viewpoint that we define an integer number system (for example) to be a collection $S$ of objects, together with operations $+$ and $\times$, such that the axioms for the integers are satisfied. I’m not claiming the axioms are “true”, I’m just defining an integer number system to be a thing that satisfies these axioms. Introducing or imagining the existence of an integer number system might be useful for modeling the physical world, but one must do experiments to check that integer models make accurate predictions in the real world. – littleO Nov 29 '23 at 12:52
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"True" basically means it conforms the law of identity, or A=A. That's all logic is, comparing two things to see if they're the same or different. – Matt Gregory Nov 29 '23 at 12:54
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But compare with this post – Mauro ALLEGRANZA Nov 29 '23 at 13:05
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"true" means exactly what it means in common sense usage: to agree with facts. Thus, when we say that the axioms of arithmetic are true, we mean that they correctly "describe" the usual known facts about numbers. – Mauro ALLEGRANZA Nov 29 '23 at 13:07
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Repose to (1): this is a philosophical dilemma. Response to (2): What does "Is mathematics typographical?" mean? Response to (3): Yes. – Adam Rubinson Nov 29 '23 at 13:25
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Axioms are not true or false in some meta way, they are used to separate objects that we want to study from the objects that we don't want to study. Is axiom of commutativity true or false? No. It's satisfied by some objects and not satisfied by other objects (and doesn't even make sense for many others). Only when you look at particular theory you get to define semantics for that theory and you can say what is true or false within that theory. Axioms that define that theory are then declared to be true. – Ennar Nov 29 '23 at 13:40
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A well-formed formula φ is true in some Theory T ( T is a set of Axioms) iff T proves φ, i.e. there is a finite sequence of valid deductions ( implications) , starting from axioms in T , which in end with φ . Thus,axioms are vacuously true in any theory T, as φ always implies φ. Note: What constitutes a valid mathematical deduction, depends on what Axioms of Logic one is assuming, in your meta-mathematics. Also, notice with finitely many applications of Modus Ponens, if we have such a sequence of implications - any φ in the sequence can be shown to be true. – Michael Carey Nov 29 '23 at 20:05
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Wow, thank you, this makes it a lot simpler than I was making it. Where did you learn this definition by the way? – Hasan Zaeem Nov 30 '23 at 04:19
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1@Michael Carey, what you describe is syntactic provability, not semantic truth. For "iff" to hold, you need soundness and completeness theorems. – Ennar Nov 30 '23 at 10:30
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@HasanZaeem I'm glad it helped! I believe its the standard presentation taught in Mathematical Logic, at least that's how it was presented to me. – Michael Carey Nov 30 '23 at 13:12
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@Ennar You are right. I figured going into any more technical detail would be getting away from the point. It's hard to gauge what level to present an idea on a public forum with varying backgrounds. But yes, my presentation is displaying truth as "theorems", on top of all the tools of first order logic. Which is something of a very math focused presentation. A more logic focused presentation would care about soundness and completeness. – Michael Carey Nov 30 '23 at 13:30
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@Ennar thank you for pointing that out, soundness and completeness are of course extremely vital when discussing truth – Michael Carey Nov 30 '23 at 13:55
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1@Michael Carey, I agree that in "every day mathematics" we usually don't care about the difference between syntax and semantics that much, but as you say, distinction is very important from the perspective of mathematical logic, especially in the light of Gödel's theorems. – Ennar Nov 30 '23 at 14:21
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@MichaelCarey What are the axioms of logic? Is there a general interpretation of mathematics? I’m thinking of first order logic / classical logic with modus pones etc, but are there more? Where can I read about it? – Hasan Zaeem Nov 30 '23 at 23:19
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@HasanZaeem Kunen's "The Foundations of Mathematics" has a chapter on it. One's logic usually has a handful of axioms embedded in it. Some important ones have to do with =, and properties around Universal Quantifiers. Modus Ponens is a rule of inference- a way to get from one formula to another- so it's more like a derivation technique than an axiom. – Michael Carey Dec 01 '23 at 01:13
3 Answers
The appropriate phrasing is to say that an axiom is satisfied in a model. Thus, the group axioms are satisfied by the group $\mathbb Z_2$. The axiom of separation is satisfied by any model of set theory. The Peano Axioms are satisfied by the natural numbers. Here truth would be a separate issue.

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Mathematical 'truth' is different from the way we normally talk about 'truth'. For example, an everyday claim like 'grass is green' is considered 'true' because it accurately describes our world .. the very physical world we live in. Put simply, 'grass is green' is true because the grass around us is in fact green. And 'grass is pink' is false, because in our world grass is not pink.
Mathematicians, however, are not necessarily concerned with what our world looks like. Like logicians, they are happy to consider imaginary and abstract worlds where there are 'flubbers' that are 'brillig'. But note: in such a world, 'flubbers are brillig' would be true. In other words, 'truth' is relative to a world: in one world a claim would be true, but in some other world, that same claim would be false. In Euclidian worlds, Euclid's 'parallel postulate' would be true, but in non-Euclidian worlds, that same postulate would be false.
But this is exactly why in mathematics we have axioms. Using axioms, a mathematician is restricting their considerations to certain types of worlds: those worlds in which the axioms are true. And by deriving theorems from those axioms, we can find out other things about those kinds of worlds, i.e. other statements that are 'true-in-those-worlds'. As such, mathematicians can prove all kinds of things without having to worry about what things are true in our world.
The same goes for 'existence' claims that you often encounter in mathematics. For example: 'there exists an infinite number of primes'. By this, mathematics are not necessarily talking about our world .. or are even asserting that in our world numbers exist ... what they really say is that 'in any world where the axioms for basic numbers (e.g. the Peano axioms) are true, there are infinitely many prime numbers'.
Having said all that though, it is a bit of straw man or exaggeration to say that mathematicians and logicians are not interested in our world. Of course it would be nice if these axioms would be true in our world, i.e. if they describe something (approximately) accurately about our world. And this is why we don't have branches of mathematics that talk about flubbers being brillig, but instead talk about numbers, geometrical shapes, etc.: things that do seem to apply to our world pretty well ... and sometimes really well ... as scientists are finding out.

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"Mathematical 'truth' is different from the way we normally talk about 'truth'. " I disagree :-) You say: "An everyday claim like 'grass is green' is considered 'true' because ..." grass is green (usually). But consider @Mikhail Katz's answer above: "The appropriate phrasing is to say that an axiom is satisfied in a model" and it seems to sounds like: "but in math things are different." Is it so, really? What is the satisfaction clause for an atomic formula of e.g. first order arithmetic? 1/2 – Mauro ALLEGRANZA Nov 30 '23 at 10:15
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It is something like: "a formula $t=s$ is satisfied by variable assignment $v$ in model $\mathfrak M$ iff $v(t)=v(r)$ where $v(t)$ and $v(r)$ are element of the corresponding domain. If we "instantiate" it to numbers, we have the domain $\mathbb N$ and the "elements" $v(t)$ and $v(s)$ are numbers. Thus, in conclusion the very formal: $\mathbb N \vDash (t=r)[v]$ holds iff "the two numbers $v(t)$ and $v(r)$ are equal", that sounds very like "...iff the grass is green" 2/2 – Mauro ALLEGRANZA Nov 30 '23 at 10:19
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@HasanZaeem If you don’t understand why ‘grass is green’ is a true statement, then I suppose your question isn’t just about mathematical truth, but about truth, period, in which case I suggest you go to the philosophy stack exchange and ask there what ‘truth’ is. – Bram28 Nov 30 '23 at 12:51
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@MauroALLEGRANZA All true, but I gave my answer thinking that the OP was looking for a much more conceptual/informal response. In fact, given the comment I got from the OP, it looks like the OP is looking for something much more philosophical rather than mathematical. But I could be wrong, certainly! – Bram28 Nov 30 '23 at 12:54
We can think of axioms as the rules of a game. So by analogy, consider the question, “Can I move my pawn three squares to the left?” When we are playing chess, the answer is that no, you cannot move your pawn three squares to the left. But can the sentence
You cannot move your pawn three squares to the left.
be called true? I mean even a mere toddler might very well come up to the board, pick up that pawn, and place it down on the very square in question. So in some contexts the sentence isn’t true, the answer is that, yes, it’s quite possible.
That’s the very nature of axioms. That’s how mathematicians build things. Now, a physicist say, might be more likely to build some math in order to encapsulate and model empirical observations about the world around us. And that’s a different beast entirely. For physicists, the ultimate consideration is conformity to empirical observations, whereas for mathematicians it’s conformity to our definitions and the laws of logic. In that sense, axioms are one flavor of mathematicians’ definitions.
For a more mathematical example, consider whether one can divide by zero, or to put it another way, whether there can be any two nonzero “things” whose product is zero. In the real numbers, the answer is, no, the definition of division on $\bf R$ precludes $0$ as a divisor. But in a different setting, say the ring of $2\times 2$ matrices on $\bf R$, things are different. Here, zero means $\left(\begin{array}{cc} 0&0 \\ 0&0\end{array}\right)$, and we have facts like $$ \left(\begin{array}{cc} x&x\\y&y \end{array}\right) \left(\begin{array}{cc} 1&1\\-1&-1 \end{array}\right) =\left(\begin{array}{cc} 0&0\\0&0 \end{array}\right) $$ for any $x,y\in \bf R$.
If you want a mathematical example where the “things” are more like everyday numbers, consider the 10-adics, a number system in which there exists a number $$x\approx \ldots92256259918212890625$$ with the property that $x^2=x$, which can be checked by performing the first $k$ steps of the multiplication for any $k\geq 1$. But this means that $x^2-x=0$, and thus that $x(x-1)=0$. So we have a pair of 10-addic numbers, $x$ and $x-1$, neither of which is zero but whose product is zero.

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