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In Velleman, How To Prove It?, we learn to prove a goal of the form $\exists x P(x)$ by extracting the existential quantifier from the goal, assigning a value to an arbitrary variable x and then deriving $\exists x P(x)$ from the introduced assumption. In the example below, to prove $\exists y[y+2x=0]$ (1), we assume $y$ and assign to it the value $-2x$ (2) and derive the goal from this assumption (3).

  1. $\exists y[y+2x=0]$
  2. $ [y=-2x] \rightarrow [y+2x=0]$
  3. $ [y=-2x] \space \land \exists y[y+2x=0] \rightarrow [y+2x=0]$

I really do not understand how is it possible to assume the value assignment to y as one of the givens in the proof. Is a mathetical equality logically treated as a tautology, so that it can be unrestrictedly assumed in any proof?

TylerD007
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1 Answers1

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"we assume $y$ and assign to it the value $−2x$" probably does not mean what you are thinking. We do not assume $y$ -- $y$ is not a proposition so we are not able to assume it. We don't assume the proposition $[y]$, either. What we are doing is saying, "You know, if $y$ were set to this special value, $y = -2x$, then this all works."

So we assume "$y = -2x$". This isn't automatic. We have had to do some behind-the-scenes algebra to find out what special value of $y$ makes all this work. That algebra is not shown. You just start from the correct choice of the value of $y$. So we assume $y = -2x$, that is, we assume the proposition "$[y = -2x]$" (is true).

That assumption has consequences. In particular, you should be able to derive $$ [y = -2x] \rightarrow [y+2x = 0] $$ along $$ y + 2x = (-2x) + 2x = 0 \text{.} $$ This requires some use of algebra, there is no way to perform this addition using just logic -- you have to know algebraic facts about additive inverses.

So you obtain $[y = -2x] \rightarrow [y+2x = 0]$. This allows you to deduce $\exists y [y+2x=0]$, because you actually know what specialization of $y$ makes this true, namely $y = -2x$.

Your line 3 looks a little odd. What we actually have is $$ \left( [y = -2x] \rightarrow [y+2x = 0] \right) \rightarrow \exists y[y+2x = 0] \text{.} $$ That is, "since the specialization $y = -2x$ makes $y + 2x = 0$, we conclude there exists a $y$ such that $y+2x = 0$." That $y$ is $-2x$.

How does one write this out? Note we have produced a conditional statement: "if $y$ is $-2x$, then $y+2x = 0$." This will be a sub-proof.

... blah blah blah ...

Let $y = -2x$. Observe $y+2x = (-2x)+2x = 0$. So we deduce $\exists y [y+2x = 0]$.

... blah blah blah ...

What's the form of the argument?

  • Let $y = \{\text{a value that works}\}$. We find that value using algebra in this example.
  • Observe that the expression in the predicate that has been existentially quantified is made true by the assignment of the variable $y$ to the value in the prior step.
  • Conclude there exists a value of $y$ that makes the existentially quantified predicate true. (Namely, the one you exhibited in the first step.)

It occurs to me that there could be a little confusion caused by the two distinct uses of "$y$" in the statement of the proof form, $$ \left( [y = -2x] \rightarrow [y+2x = 0] \right) \rightarrow \exists y[y+2x = 0] \text{.} $$ On the right-hand side, the variable $y$ is bound by the existential quantifier; it has syntactic scope only until the end of the quantified clause. We could just replace it with another variable and get a semantically equivalent statement: $$ \left( [y = -2x] \rightarrow [y+2x = 0] \right) \rightarrow \exists z[z+2x = 0] \text{.} $$ This is still a valid inference.

On the left-hand side, $x$ and $y$ appear unquantified, so they are free (antonym of bound) variables. Free variables are implicitly universally quantified at the largest enclosing scope. If we make that quantification explicit, we need to change the bound variable on the right-hand side to maintain syntactic validity. (That is, it is a syntax error to have a statement with $y$ bound twice in nested clauses. $y$ can be bound in two disjoint clauses, but one should bear in mind that the two $y$s need not have the same value.) So, with the implicit quantifications, $$ \forall x \forall y \left( \left( [y = -2x] \rightarrow [y+2x = 0] \right) \rightarrow \exists z[z+2x = 0] \right) \text{.} $$

I discuss this because in comments, you proposed $$ \left( [y = -2x] \rightarrow [y+2x = 0] \right) \rightarrow \left( [y = -2x] \rightarrow \exists z[z+2x = 0] \right) \text{.} $$ This is much weaker that the proof form described above and the reason why has to do with the unbound use of $y$ and $x$ in the parenthesized implication on the right. The parenthesized implication on the left says:

If, in some proof, you have the fact "$y = -2x$" already established, then you may deduce the fact "$y + 2x = 0$".

This requires that the state of the implicitly universally quantified variables in your context must contain or imply that $y = -2x$ in order to obtain the consequent. Likewise, the parenthesized implication on the right says:

(Assuming the antecedent, the left-hand parenthesized implication, is already established,) if in some proof, you have the fact "$y = -2x$" already established, then you may deduce the fact "$\exists z [z + 2x = 0]$".

This right-hand implication does not make the plain assertion "$\exists z [z + 2x = 0]$ is true". It makes the much weaker assertion "the state of the implicitly universally quantified variables $x$ and $y$ in your context must contain or imply that $y = -2x$ and then you may infer $\exists z [z + 2x = 0]$ is true".

But "$\exists z [z + 2x = 0]$" should be independent of the free variable $y$. (Equivalently, "$\exists y [y + 2x = 0]$" should be independent of the free variable $y$, since the free variable $y$ is not mentioned in this quantified clause.)

The version you produced is weaker because it only asserts the existentially quantified result in (free variable) contexts where $y = -2x$. But $\exists z [z+2x = 0]$ should be true in any context (in which the material has the relation $[y = -2x] \leftrightarrow [y+2x=0]$), regardless of the values of the unbound variables $x$ and $y$.

Eric Towers
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  • Thank you, Mr Towers. As you said, $\left( [y = -2x] \rightarrow [y+2x = 0] \right) \rightarrow \exists y[y+2x = 0] $. This statement holds, only if $y = -2x$ is a tautology. Is that so? – TylerD007 Aug 21 '20 at 22:21
  • @TylerD007 : No. This is a conditional. IF (IF "$y = -2x$" is true implies "$y + 2x = 0$" is true) is true THEN there exists a $y$ such that ...blah blah blah. The proposition "$y = -2x$" is not assigned a truth value, so it is not automatically true. Since all tautologies are automatically true, "$y = -2x$" is not a tautology. – Eric Towers Aug 21 '20 at 22:26
  • I still don't get it. $[y+2x = 0]$ alone implies $\exists y[y+2x = 0]$. Therefore, if $[y = -2x]$ implies $[y+2x = 0]$, then $[y = -2x]$ also implies $\exists y[y+2x = 0]$. In such case, the correct statement would be $\left( [y = -2x] \rightarrow [y+2x = 0] \right) \rightarrow \left( [y = -2x] \rightarrow \exists y[y+2x = 0] \right)$. – TylerD007 Aug 21 '20 at 22:33
  • @TylerD007 : No. You seem to be confused about the sub-proof. From the assumption $y = -2x$, you (sub)-prove that $y + 2x = 0$. Then that (entire assumption + proof) is the proof that $\exists y$. What you have written is technically weaker : from (if $y = -2x$ then $y+2x = 0$) we conclude (if $y = -2x$ then $\exists y$ such that $y + 2x = 0$). Your version gives us (for future steps in the surrounding proof) the conditional "if $y = -2x$ then $\exists y$ such that $y + 2x = 0$". This is much weaker than the unconditional statement "$(\exists y$ such that $y + 2x = 0)$ is true". – Eric Towers Aug 21 '20 at 23:13
  • Last question: since $[y = -2x]$ is equivalent to $[y+2x = 0]$, could we conclude that $\left( [y = -2x] \rightarrow [y+2x = 0] \right)$ is a tautology? – TylerD007 Aug 22 '20 at 02:09
  • @TylerD007 : Yes. It is important to realize that the arrow in this statement represents a material inference, not a formal inference. That is, it represents information about the material under study, algebra, not a result that follows from formal logic. Again, though, this is weaker than the result you should be able to get, the tautology $([y = -2x] \leftrightarrow [y+2x = 0])$ for all assignments of values to the material variables $x$ and $y$. – Eric Towers Aug 22 '20 at 13:26
  • Therefore, I presume that the assumption $([y=f(x)]→x=[f-1 (y)])$ can only be introduced, if the function f(x) is bijective or if the domain x is restricted, so that a bijective relation can be derived. Is that true? – TylerD007 Aug 22 '20 at 13:53
  • @TylerD007 : I've added a bit about the difference between the unbound $y$ and the bound $y$ in the $(\rightarrow) \rightarrow (\rightarrow)$ statement form that you proposed together with a discussion of how it is a weaker resulting proof form than the one that Velleman described. – Eric Towers Aug 22 '20 at 13:54
  • @TylerD007 : I think you mean "$[y = f(x)] \rightarrow [x = f^{-1}(y)]$". I agree that this is not a formal logical fact. The truth of this proposition would depend on material details of the function $f$ and the definition of inverse function.

    Depending on your mathematical context, it may be understood that inverse functions are set-valued, so $x$ and $y$ represent sets. In other contexts, you will see something like "let $f$ be an invertible function", "let $f$ be a bijection", "let $f$ be a homeomorphism", or some other material constraint on $f$ that makes its inverse exist.

    – Eric Towers Aug 22 '20 at 14:00
  • I understand it now. Either way, the left side of the introduced assumption (value assignment + other conditions) must be in a biconditional relation with its right side (quantified formula in the goal of the proof). Using Velleman's example in How to Prove It?, $x > 0 \land y=\frac{\sqrt{4x +1}-1}{2}$ is true, if and only if $y(y+1)=x$. – TylerD007 Aug 22 '20 at 14:10
  • @TylerD007 : Your last sentence should not contain a biimplication. Velleman only proves the implication. Also, the biimplication is wrong. $$[y(y+1) = x] \rightarrow ( [x \geq -1/4] \wedge ( [y = \frac{1}{2}(-1 + \sqrt{4x+1}] \vee [y = \frac{1}{2}(-1 - \sqrt{4x+1}] ) )$$, which means there are specializations of the variables $x$ and $y$ making the right-hand side of your biimplication true and the left-hand side false, for instance $x = y = 0$. – Eric Towers Aug 22 '20 at 14:25
  • In p. 150, Velleman works with the following proof: $\forall x(x \neq 2 \rightarrow \exists y [2y/(y+1) = x \land \forall z (2z/(z+1) = x \rightarrow z=y)])$. His first step is to extract the existential quantifier from the goal (I think, through prenexation) and then immediately introduce the assumption $y=x/(2-x)$. Hence, as a result, we have: $\forall x \exists y (x \neq 2 \land y=x/(2-x) \rightarrow 2y/(y+1) = x \land \forall z (2z/(z+1) = x \rightarrow z=y))$. It doesn't seem to me that the author is working here with subproofs, as you explained. (continues...) – TylerD007 Aug 23 '20 at 14:50
  • If that would be the case, then he would be obliged to prove the uniqueness part of the goal ($\forall z(2z/(z+1) ...)$) directly as a goal in the subproof. I still can't understand from where the author assumes the value assignment, since the only way he could be able to do that, is if the assignment would be a tautology per se, and that is not true, as you said (and I agree). – TylerD007 Aug 23 '20 at 15:04
  • @TylerD007 : NO ONE is asserting the truth of $[y = \frac{x}{2-x}]$. What is being asserted is the conditional "if $y = \frac{x}{2-x}$, then $\frac{2y}{y+1} = x$", which is the clause you have written. That clause is the result of the subproof: "Assume $y = \frac{2}{2-x}$. . Therefore, $\frac{2y}{y+1} = x$." You keep writing as if you conflate that conditional with the bald assertion of the truth of its condition. What has been done is replacing the existential clause "$\exists y \dots$" with an instance of such a $y$ sub-proven to satisfy the "$\dots$". (cont.) – Eric Towers Aug 24 '20 at 11:27
  • @TylerD007 : It may turn out that this instance of $y$ is not sufficient to satisfy the other clauses. It may turn out that it is. If it is not sufficient, one should look for other solutions of the existentially quantified "$\dots$" that also satisfy the other clauses. The subproof is only that the proposed value of $y$ satisfies the existentially quantified clause. Subsequent steps determine whether the proposed value of $y$ is compatible with other clauses. – Eric Towers Aug 24 '20 at 11:32
  • Mr Towers, I'm afraid I still haven't made my question quite clear. My pivotal concern is the formal structure of the entire proof. As we know, $(A \land B) \rightarrow C$ does not imply $A \rightarrow C$, so why $\forall x \exists y (x \neq 2 \land y=x/(2-x) \rightarrow 2y/(y+1) = x \land \forall z (2z/(z+1) = x \rightarrow z=y))$ would imply $\forall x \exists y (x \neq 2 \rightarrow 2y/(y+1) = x \land \forall z (2z/(z+1) = x \rightarrow z=y))$? The only way that could be true is if $y=x/(2-x)$ is a tautology, which is not the case. (cont.) – TylerD007 Aug 24 '20 at 13:06
  • I tried to follow the reasoning how it is possible to replace an existentially quantified goal for the assumption of a substitution instance of the goal, but I failed to understand it, especially when considering other clauses inside the scope of existential quantifier. If you could provide me with a step-by-step scratch work of the formal structure of the proof in the previous example, I'm sure I'll be able to get a grasp of it. – TylerD007 Aug 24 '20 at 13:46
  • @TylerD007 :Velleman already does so in the text of this section. I'm not convinced you have read that text slowly and verified that you understand what is written there. We replace "$\exists y$ such that $P(y)$" with "in fact, if $y = (\text{specific expression})$ then $P(y)$ is true." This is exactly, literally the replacement that is made. – Eric Towers Aug 24 '20 at 13:50
  • I read it many times, but I can't see how you keep the logical equivalence from one statement to the other one or at least, how the latter implies the former. Let's work with a simplified example. Assuming $\Gamma$ is a set of formulas, consider we have the proof $\Gamma \rightarrow \exists y[P(y) \land \forall z Q(y, z)]$. How can we introduce the substitution instance P(a) into the givens of the proof, at the the same time we extract the $\exists$-quantifier from the goal? (cont.) – TylerD007 Aug 24 '20 at 13:53
  • In other words, how is it possible that $\Gamma \rightarrow \exists y[P(y) \land \forall z Q(y, z)]$ is equivalent to $\Gamma \land P(a) \rightarrow P(y) \land \forall z Q(y, z)$ or how the latter implies the former? – TylerD007 Aug 24 '20 at 13:56
  • There is not logical equivalence. There is implication. The assumed form of $y$ satisfies the existentially quantified predicate. There may be other forms of $y$ that satisfy that predicate, consequently, it is not an equivalence. – Eric Towers Aug 24 '20 at 14:03
  • Alright. Let's simplify our example even more and consider only $\Gamma \rightarrow \exists y P(y)$. Then, we have that $[\Gamma \land P(a) \rightarrow P(y)] \rightarrow [\Gamma \rightarrow \exists y P(y)]$. That's equivalent to $\Gamma \land [P(a) \rightarrow P(y)] \rightarrow \exists y P(y)$. And that formula is equivalent to $\Gamma \land \neg P(a) \rightarrow \exists y P(y)$. That is not a tautology... – TylerD007 Aug 24 '20 at 14:11
  • @TylerD007 : You have written nothing that follows Velleman's proof pattern. From $\Gamma \rightarrow \exists y P(y)$, assuming we can find such an $a$, we obtain $\Gamma \rightarrow \left([y = a] \rightarrow P(y) \right)$, from which we conclude $\left(\Gamma \wedge [y=a] \right) \rightarrow P(y)$. This is not a biimplication or an equivalence. $\Gamma$ and other choices of assignment to $y$ may also entail $P(y)$. It is also not a tautology; we have no route to $\Gamma \rightarrow P(y)$. – Eric Towers Aug 24 '20 at 19:08
  • Thank you, Mr Towers. Correct me if I am wrong. $\forall y[(y=a) \rightarrow P(y)]$ is equivalent to P(a). Then, $\forall y[(\Gamma \land [y=a]) \rightarrow P(y)]$ is equivalent to $\Gamma \rightarrow P(a)$. This last statement does indeed imply $\Gamma \rightarrow \exists y P(y)$. However, this implication is what you called the "weaker" version of Velleman's proof structure. Am I failing to place the quantifiers correctly? – TylerD007 Aug 24 '20 at 19:34
  • EDIT: I suposse the "stronger" form would be $\forall y [(((\Gamma \land (y = a)) \rightarrow P(y)) \rightarrow (\Gamma \rightarrow \exists y P(y))]$. That would imply $\Gamma \rightarrow P(a) \rightarrow \Gamma \rightarrow \exists y P(y)$ as it should be. – TylerD007 Aug 24 '20 at 19:50
  • @TylerD007 : It is absolutely false that "$\forall [(\Gamma \wedge [y = a]) \rightarrow P(y)]$ is equivalent to $\Gamma \rightarrow P(a)$". Your claim to the contrary makes it overwhelmingly clear that you are wasting both of our time. You should go back and re-read Velleman very slowly, making sure you understand why each sentence is correct. I'm done with my half of wasting our time. – Eric Towers Aug 24 '20 at 21:38
  • $(\rightarrow)$ Assume $\forall y[(y=a) \rightarrow P(y)]$. Then, by UI, $(a = a) \rightarrow P(a)$. Hence, $P(a)$. $(\leftarrow)$ Assume $P(a)$. Let an arbitrary y. Let $y=a$. Since $P(a)$ and $y=a$, then P(y). Since y is arbitrary, $\forall y[(y=a) \rightarrow P(y)]$. Since $P(a)$ is $\forall y[(y=a) \rightarrow P(y)]$, then $\Gamma \rightarrow P(a)$ is equivalent to $\Gamma \rightarrow \forall y[(y=a) \rightarrow P(y)]$. If y does not occur in $\Gamma$, we have $\forall y [\Gamma \rightarrow [(y=a) \rightarrow P(y)]]$, which means $\forall y [\Gamma \land (y=a) \rightarrow P(y)]$. – TylerD007 Aug 24 '20 at 22:29