a) The pattern THH always occurs before the pattern HHH unless the pattern HHH occurs right away. The probability for it to occur right away is $0.7^3=0.343$, so the probability for THH to occur first is $1-0.343=0.657$.
b) Mike has already provided a nice solution for this part. Here's another approach:
Note that the two patterns always alternate at getting a chance to be completed by an H: If HT fails to be completed to HTH, we have TT, and after some number of Ts we will end up with TH. That gives a chance to complete THH with an H, and if that fails, we have HT, which starts the cycle over.
Now if two players have alternating chances of winning with probability $q=0.7$, the probability of the player going first winning is
$$q+(1-q)^2q+\dotso=\frac q{1-(1-q)^2}=\frac q{2q-q^2}=\frac1{2-q}\;.$$
Now the HT chance comes up first if the first flip is an H, with probability $q$, whereas if the first flip is a T, with probability $1-q$, the TH chance comes up first. Thus the probability for HTH to come first is
$$
q\frac 1{2-q}+(1-q)\left(1-\frac1{2-q}\right)
=\frac {q+(1-q)(1-q)}{2-q}
=\frac {1-q+q^2}{2-q}\;.
$$
With $q=0.7$, this is $79/130\approx0.608$.
c) Let $p$ denote the probability for HHH to come first. Let's find an equation for $p$ by tracing how the chances for completing the patterns evolve. First we have to wait for an H. Then with probability $1-q$ we get a T, and HHH loses unless this is followed by another T, again with probability $1-q$. Then we're back where we started, so this branch contributes a winning probability $(1-q)^2p$. On the other hand, with probability $q$ the first H is followed by another H. Then we have probability $q$ for another H to complete HHH, and probability $1-q$ for a T, in which case, as before, we must have another T, with probability $1-q$, to avoid HTH and get back to where we started; so this branch contributes a winning probability $q(q+(1-q)^2p)$. In total, we have
$$p=(1-q)^2p+q(q+(1-q)^2p)\;,$$
and solving for $p$ yields
$$p=\frac q{1+q-q^2}\;.$$
For $q=0.7$, this is $70/121\approx0.579$.
Collecting the results, we find that THH beats HHH with probability $0.657$, HTH beats THH with probability $0.608$, and HHH beats HTH with probability $0.579$. Thus, if we restrict the game to these three choices, there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium: Whichever two of these three patterns have been chosen, it pays for one of the two players to switch to the remaining pattern.