According to Jeremy Avigad's description of Gödel's original argument (http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/avigad/Papers/goedel.pdf) the second step in the proof establish the following result :
If a set $S$ of propositional formulas is not refutable, it has a satisfying truth assignment.
Let $S$ = {$\phi_0, \phi_1, \phi_2$, . . .}. Build a finitely branching tree where the nodes at level one are all the truth assignments to variables of $\phi_0$ that make $\phi_0$ true; the nodes at level two are all the truth assignments to variables of $\phi_0 \land \phi_1$ that make that formula true; and so on. (The descendants of a node are all the truth assignments that extend it.) If, at some level $k$, there is no satisfying assignment to $\phi_0 \land \phi_1 \land . . . \land \phi_{k−1}$, then $S$ is refutable. Otherwise, by Konig’s lemma, there is a path through the tree, which corresponds to a satisfying truth assignment for $S$.
I think that this is the basic construction used in R.Smullyan, First-Order Logic (1968 - Dover reprint) for the proof of the Compactness Theorem for propositional logic (pag.30-on).
Question 1) Am I right ?
At pag.34 Smullyan gives the following argument :
"we wish to point out that although we used [...] Konig's lemma in our proof of the compactness theorem, [it is not] really essential."
After the construction (pag.36), he discuss the result :
"The above proof nowhere uses Konig's lemma [...]. The above construction in effect generates the leftmost infinite branch of the complete tableau for $S$."
Question 2) In what sense he can dispense with Konig's lemma ?
My last concern is with tableaux method as a proof procedure (for propositional logic).
Assume that $A$ is a tautology (or, if $S$ is a finite set of formulae, let $A$ their conjunction, so that there is not a really limitation in considering a single formula).
Applying the method, we can build, in a finite number of steps, a closed tableau $\mathcal{T}$ ($A$ is a tautology).
Due to the fact that we are dealing with a single formula (or a finite set of them) we exploit the property that we are building a tree $\mathcal{T}$ in which every branch is finite.
Question 3) If I do not need Konig's lemma for the proof of this fact, may I say that this is a constructive proof procedure for propositional logic ?