Starting at 7:52 of this video, the professor presents a proof of the following theorem: for any infinite set of well-formed formulas $\Sigma$ such that $\Sigma \vDash \alpha$, where $\alpha$ is a w.f.f., there exists a finite subset $\Sigma_0 \subset \Sigma$ such that $\Sigma_0 \vDash \alpha$.
This is how I understood his proof (with comments of mine in bold):
Since $\alpha$ is a w.f.f., it involves only finitely many propositional variables, so there are only finitely many truth assignments in its truth table.
Isn't this already an issue? There are only finitely many truth assignments whose domains are the set of just those propositional variables that appear in $\alpha$. But in the larger context of an arbitrary infinite $\Sigma$, whose formulas could collectively involve infinitely many propositional variables, there could be infinitely many truth assignments for each combination fo truth values of those variables that appear in $\alpha$.
Let $V_i$ be a truth assignment for which $V_i(\alpha) = \mathrm{F}$. Therefore it cannot be the case that $\Sigma$ is satisfied under this assignment, since $\Sigma \vDash \alpha$, which implies there must be some $\alpha_{ij} \in \Sigma$ such that $V_i(\alpha_i) = \mathrm{F}$. For each $V_i$, pick one of these $\alpha_{ij}$ and rename it as $\alpha_i$. We claim that $\Sigma_0 = \{ \alpha_i: for all $i$ \}$ is a finite set such that $\Sigma_0 \vDash \alpha$. To see why, note that $\Sigma_0 \vDash \alpha$ if an only if $\Sigma_0 \cup \{ \neg \alpha \}$ is not satisfiable.
Assume by way of contradiction that $\Sigma_0 \cup \{ \neg \alpha \}$ is satisfiable. Then there exists a truth assignment $V$ such that $V(\neg \alpha) = \mathrm{F} \implies V(\alpha) = \mathrm{F}$. At this point, he asserts that any such $V$ is one of those $V_i$ referenced earlier (those $V_i$ for which $V_i(\alpha) = \mathrm{F}$ --- "we are in one of those rows of the truth table of $\alpha$ where $\alpha$ is false"). Since we constructed $\Sigma_0$ in such a way that for every $\alpha_i \in Sigma_0$ at least one $V_i$ is such that $V_i(\alpha_i) = \mathrm{F}$, so $\Sigma_0$ isn't satisfied by these $V_i$, which contradicts our assertion that $\Sigma_0 \cup \{ \alpha \}$ is satisfiable, proving the theorem.
What stands out as an issue to me: In the case that $\Sigma$ involves infinitely many different propositional variables, there would be infinitely many truth assignments. In particular, there would be infinitely many truth assignments for any combination of truth values of those variables that appear in $\alpha$. By looking at just one of them and then picking one $\alpha_i$ for $\Sigma_0$ in the way described, we can't be sure that the other truth assignments that assign the same truth values to the variables in $\alpha$ would assign $\mathrm{F}$ to $\alpha_i$, breaking the proof. If $\Sigma$, despite being infinite, involved only finitely many propositional variables, then it would be possible to look at every single truth assignment $V_i$ for which $V_i(\alpha) = \mathrm{F}$ --- since there would be only finitely many, but possibly more than just $2^n$, where $n$ is the number of propositional variables in $\alpha$ --- and include in $\Sigma_0$ an $\alpha_i \in \Sigma$ for which $V_i(\alpha_i) = \mathrm{F}$ for each of these $V_i$. This would ensure that we are in fact "in one of those rows of the truth table of $\alpha$ where $\alpha$ is false".
So it looks to me like what was really proved is a version of the theorem where $\Sigma$ involves finitely many different propositional variables. Is this really the case?