Many times in a math textbook, we see the phrase "$X$ is true because of $Y$", or "$X$ is false because of $Y$". For example, consider the relation on $\mathbb{R}^2$ which is the set-theoretic union of the two functions defined by the equations $f(x)=x$ and $f(x)=-x$, respectively. Suppose some high school textbook asks a multiple choice question about whether that relation is a function, and one of the choices is "It is not a function because there are multiple $x$-values for some $y$-values", and another choice is "It is not a function because there are multiple $y$-values for some $x$-values". Intuitively, the teacher would mark the first answer wrong and the second answer right. However, since that relation is in fact not a function, any statement of the form "If $P$, then that relation is not a function" is true no matter what the statement $P$ is, since any conditional with a true consequent is automatically true.
To give another example, suppose I write the two statements, "The derivative of $x^2 + sin(x)$ is $2x + cos(x)$ because of the derivative sum rule" and "The derivative of $x^2 + sin(x)$ is $2x + cos(x)$ because Fermat's Last Theorem is true". Intuitively, the first statements is true and the second false, and in fact if, in a calculus class, a student writes the latter instead of the former, he would probably be marked wrong. However, again, both implications are true because the consequent is true. So, these and many other examples show that "because" is not the same as "implies". My question is, has there been, in some text, a formal and rigorous analysis of "because", at least as applied to mathematical statements? Perhaps that text also gives a definition of "because". Or, is this, in fact, not a notion amenable to rigorization and formalization, and just one of those "You know it when you see it" concepts that are not precisely defined?