We need to distinguish between the formal syntax of the predicate calculus, and prose exposition.
Predicate calculus has precise syntax rules for good reasons, and these dictate that the quantifiers come in front. (Examples below.) But in prose exposition, people often put them afterwards. On the other hand, in textbooks and such, you won't usually find the symbol $\forall$ used as a shorthand for the words "for all". (In handwritten notes or on the blackboard, sure.)
The formal syntax handles alternating universal and existential quantifiers without ambiguity. Consider the distinction between uniform and pointwise convergence of a sequence of functions, $f_n\to f$, say on the interval $(0,1)$. First, uniform:
$$\forall \epsilon\; \exists N\; \forall n\!\!>\!\!N\;\forall x\!\!\in\!\!(0,1)\;
|f_n(x)-f(x)|<\epsilon$$
and then pointwise:
$$\forall \epsilon\;\forall x\!\!\in\!\!(0,1)\; \exists N\; \forall n\!\!>\!\!N\;
|f_n(x)-f(x)|<\epsilon$$
The distinction is subtle enough that Cauchy initially got it wrong. (Slight oversimplification of the history; see Jeremy Gray's The Real and the Complex: A History of Analysis in the 19th Century for the full story.)
Of course, you can make any chain of quantifiers clear enough in regular prose, but authors don't always do a good job of this.
By the way, "consequent" has a technical meaning in logic. It's the $B$ in an implication $A\Rightarrow B$, with $A$ be the antecedent.
Finallly, a personal opinion: I think of Aristotle’s logic as “always, sometimes, never” logic. The premises and conclusions of his syllogisms can always be cast in the form $\forall x P(x)$ or $\exists x P(x)$, where $P(x)$ is a boolean combination of some sort. Formal logic first advanced decisively beyond Aristotle when it learned to handle the alternation of quantifiers.