As is well known, fields of hyperreals $\mathbb R^*$ can be formed by an ultrapower construction, as quotients of the space of sequences of real numbers by a nonprincipal ultrafilter. In fact, some arguments using $\mathbb R^*$ can be reformulated using sequences. For example, the nonstandard definition of compactness of a set $S$ is that every point of $S^*$ is nearstandard in $S$, i.e., infinitely close to a point of $S$. This is parallel to the fact that every sequence in $S$ has a subsequence converging to a point of $S$ (an equivalent characterisation of compactness).
Other arguments cannot be reformulated as easily. For example, one can prove that a function is continuous at a point $c$ if and only if it is both right-continuous and left-continuous at $c$. Namely, an arbitrary infinitesimal $\epsilon\not=0$ is either positive or negative. If $\epsilon>0$ then right-continuity at $c$ implies that $f(c+\epsilon)\approx0$, and if $\epsilon<0$ then left-continuity at $c$ implies that $f(c+\epsilon)\approx0$, proving continuity (according to Robinson's criterion of continuity). If one tries to find a parallel argument in terms of sequences, one can immediately deal with, say, increasing or decreasing sequences in a similar way, but continuity via sequences would require testing all sequences converging to $c$, and therefore the nonstandard argument does not translate as cleanly.
Question. Are there other accessible arguments using hyperreals that would illustrate the advantage of using nonstandard definitions as compared to sequential ones?