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Given any two unrelated true statements P and Q (for example, P=1+1=2 and Q=Trump is the 45th US president), then from the mathematical logic point of view "P implies Q" is true.

However, such a statement does not make sense because of lacking "logical force".

Is there an alternative way to define "P implies Q" so that "logical force" is a must for the implication to be true?

Is there a theory under which "P implies Q" means "P is a reason for Q"?

ryang
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Tony B
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    "Is there an alternative way to define "p implies q" so that "logical force" is a must for the implication to be true?" : I would say no. What you are referring to, in the real world, is called Causation. That is, to a logician, the two statements : "If it rains I won't go to the store" and "If I go to the store, it won't rain" are equivalent. In normal English usage, the 2nd statement would be interpreted to mean that the act of going to the store somehow prevents rain clouds from releasing their moisture. Causation seems to be subjective. ...see next comment – user2661923 Oct 10 '22 at 00:54
  • Attempting to associate some (subjective) form of causation to a $P$ implies $Q$ statement, besides being problematic, doesn't seem like it would facilitate solving any Math problems. Typically, this is how (unusual) Math ideas evolve - they facilitate solving specific problems. – user2661923 Oct 10 '22 at 00:56
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    See Relevant Logic. – Mauro ALLEGRANZA Oct 10 '22 at 08:36
  • I think another salient distinction to be made here is truth derived from hypothetical reasoning vs truths that are factual information. I lack the philosophical chops to back it up though. – rschwieb Apr 07 '23 at 13:51

2 Answers2

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The implication in mathematical logic, $X \implies Y$ isn't normally used - or meant to be used - to mean one statement logically follows from the other. Instead, it's used to describe properties of mathematical objects. Let's take a simple example:

Let $X \subset \mathbb{Z}$ be such that: $x \in X, y \in X \implies x + y \in X$ (in other words, closed under addition).

In this definition, we define a set, and stipulate the elements are such the sum of any two elements of the set is also in the set. This implication isn't a logical conclusion we've somehow reached. It simply describes a property the elements of $X$ have by definition.

It doesn't make sense to demand "logical force" - because we don't usually use it in such a way.

Sometimes we use it to mean logical force, for instance: "$x > 0, y < 0 \implies x > y$" - and that's a true statement - but it's more of an informal shorthand than the typical use.

Todor Markov
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Alternative interpretation of logical implication

Given any two unrelated true statements P and Q (for example, P=1+1=2 and Q=Trump is the 45th US president), then from the mathematical logic point of view "P implies Q" is true. However, such a statement does not make sense because of lacking "logical force".

Indeed, the statement $$P\Rightarrow Q\tag1$$ lacks "logical force"—and your question doesn't match its title "logical implication"— because what you have provided offers no basis for claiming any of the following:

  • "$P$ implies $Q$" is a logical validity
  • "$P$ implies $Q$" is true regardless of interpretation
  • $P$ logically implies $Q$
  • $P$ logically entails $Q$
  • $Q$ is a logical consequence of $P$
  • $P\models Q$.

Since $Q$ ("Trump is the 45th US president") is a synthetic rather than analytic statement, the truth of statement $(1)$ is also non-analytic, thus "lacking logical force".

More to the point: if we modify the interpretation such that only those whose family name starts with 'A' are eligible to run for president, then statement $Q$ is no longer true, so statement $(1)$ is no longer true; this means that $P$ does not in fact logically imply $Q.$

On the other hand, "every city is big and Bangkok is a city" does logically (and analytically) imply "Bangkok is big": $$\big(\forall x\,(Cx\to Bx)\big)\land Ck\quad\models\quad Bk.$$


Addendum re: Todor's answer

The implication in mathematical logic, $X \implies Y$ isn't meant to be used to mean one statement logically follows from the other. Instead, it's used to describe properties of mathematical objects. This implication isn't a logical conclusion we've somehow reached. It simply describes a property the elements of $X$ have by definition. It doesn't make sense to demand "logical force" - because we don't usually use it in such a way.

Although mathematical implication is generally weaker than logical implication, once the relevant mathematical axioms (i.e., definitions) are made explicit, that is, specified as assumptions in the implication's antecedent, the former becomes the latter.

Sometimes we use it to mean logical force, for instance: "$x > 0, y < 0 \implies x > y$" but it's more of an informal shorthand than the typical use.

The statement $$x > 0\land y < 0 \implies x > y$$ implicitly means $$\forall x\:\forall y\:\big(x > 0\land y < 0 \implies x > y\big);$$ its "logical force" is due to universal implication, which, to be clear, is also generally weaker than logical implication.

ryang
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  • I don't think Kant's analytic/synthetic divide has anything to do with having logical force. Regular Euclidean geometry contains propositions of both types. "A triangle has three sides" is analytic, and "The angles of a triangle add up to two right angles" is a synthetic statement. Logical force is not an issue. I think you're going to have to find a different idea to reference. I have no doubt there is an existing term for the divide. – rschwieb Apr 07 '23 at 19:13
  • @rschwieb Hmm, I read the second sentence as analytic. You sound like you have a clear definition of "logical force", but I'm merely referencing the OP's informal usage. – ryang Apr 07 '23 at 19:26
  • No, if anything, I have a clear notion of Kant's analytic/synthetic distinction and no idea how to formalize "logical force." I vividly remember the two examples I gave from from a video lecture by Judith Grabiner. They must be quite standard because I see them echoed here – rschwieb Apr 08 '23 at 03:35
  • Analytic in this sense just means that the claim is basically a subset of what you've already been told. Everything else is synthetic. Typically the lack of a direct conclusion from the terms you've already given means some construction is necessary to bridge the gap. It does make synthetic propositions somewhat less trivial than analytic ones, but both types of propositions have the same force in hypothetical reasoning. – rschwieb Apr 08 '23 at 03:38
  • @rschwieb While Kant calls mathematical theorems (like your 2nd sentence and 7+5=12) 'synthetic a priori' (as opposed to 'synthetic posteriori' and 'analytic'), Frege calls them 'analytic'; I'm using Frege's classification. My above answer (which is consistent with both classifications, which agree that the Trump statement is synthetic and that logical validities are analytic) – ryang Apr 08 '23 at 04:40
  • is simply suggesting ideas about the OP's informally coined phrase "logical force": analytic implication, mathematical implication, universal implication, and (the strongest of all) logical implication. – ryang Apr 08 '23 at 04:40
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    I see. That is quite a variety of definitions of "analytic" there. Now that I know which one you wanted it makes sense now. – rschwieb Apr 09 '23 at 03:57