I am learning about semantics in logic, starting with proportional logic (PL). However, I struggle to fully understand some of the concepts.
There seem to be multiple ways in which a wff (well-formed formulas) of PL can be assigned meaning. The literature often speaks of:
- Interpretations: for any atomic wff $\alpha$, an interpretation of $\alpha$ is an assignment of a truth value to $\alpha$.
- Valuations: for any wff $\alpha$ with an interpretation $\mathscr{I}(\alpha)$, a valuation of $\alpha$ is an assignment of truth value to $\alpha$ based on $\mathscr{I}(\alpha)$.
Now, assuming I got the above right, what confuses me is that some authors moreover speak of interpretations as assigning what I take to be extensions (or truth conditions) to wffs (e.g., Peter Smith seems to use "interpretation" in this way in his An Introduction to Formal Logic (2022)). This procedure seems to involve connecting $\alpha$ (where $\alpha$ is an atomic wff) with a condition such that $\alpha$ is true iff the world is such that that condition is met; otherwise, $\alpha$ is false. For example, if we assign "Plato is a philosopher" as an extension to some atomic wff $P$, $P$ is true iff Plato is a philosopher.
And finally, I also encountered talk of truth functions. It seems that each wff is moreover a truth function taking truth values as inputs and returning a unique truth value as output.
Now, finally my questions:
- How do (what I labeled) "truth conditions" or "extension" fit within the overall semantics of PL? Is there an official name for this kind of meaning of a wff?
- How does the truth-functional nature of a wff fit within the overall semantics of PL? Are wffs truth functions in addition to having an interpretation and a valuation, or does their truth functionality somehow follow from the previous?
- Is the meaning of a wff determined by all of the above four concepts (interpretation, valuation, extension, or truth-functionality), or are some among them more fundamental than the others?