This mathoverflow question makes the following 2 points:
- The Gödel sentence, "this sentence is not provable", which indeed is not provable in whichever base theory that was used when formulating it and hence is true yet unprovable.
- The Löb sentence, "this sentence is provable," is indeed provable, remarkably, by Löb's theorem.
In the context of naive set theory, let us momentarily consider what one might name the Löb set:
$$L \equiv \left\{x\, |\, x\in x\right\}$$
Of course in $ZF$ set theory such a construction is not allowed, as there is no universal set over which a predicate in $x$ can be considered. But at the surface level, unlike the Russell set in which $R\in R\Leftrightarrow R\not\in R$, there is no immediate contradiction evident when either statement $L\in L$, or $L\not\in L$, are considered.
Questions
Given the well-known correspondence between Russell's Paradox and Gödel's second incompleteness theorem, one might consider the correspondence between $L$ and the Löb sentence. Moreover since Löb's theorem shows that the Löb sentence is provable, is there a corresponding theorem in set theory that proves $L\in L$?
Is there a way to even ask this question by improving the definition of $L$ within the context of axiomatic set theory, or is the notion of $L$ dead-on-arrival with no way to survive outside of naive set theory?