A function, at its bare bones, takes an input and produces an output. For example, $f(x) = x^2$ can take a value $x = 4$ and produce an output of $16$. Contrarily, the $x$ in a generating function such as $1 + x + x^2 \; + \; ...$ generally serves the purpose of a placeholder, differentiating itself from an input-output process. In light of the above, I have seen advice encouraging me to ignore the standard notion of a function when dealing with generating functions.
To now illustrate my question, I will consider the proof that $1 + x + x^2 + x^3 \; + \; ... = \frac{1}{1-x}$.
From the finite case of a geometric series, it follows that $$\sum_{k=0}^\infty x^k = \lim_{n\to\infty} \frac{1-x^n}{1-x} \color{red}{= \frac{1}{1-x}}$$
But why does it follow? If the idea of $x$ having a value is disconnected from that of a generating function, shouldn't the $\color{red}{\text{red}}$ conclusion be unsubstantiated? If there is no notion of $x \in (-1,1)$, why is one allowed to reasonably assume that $\lim_{n \to \infty} x^{n} = 0$?
On a broader note, my question is directed toward why we see a specific representation of a generating function fit if the idea of it being a function is itself disregarded. For example, if a hypothetical generating function has varying representations for different domains of $x$, how would one reasonably select the universal representation, that is, the correct domain?
In my mind, if we are transforming clay from one shape to another, the transformation should always hold to conclude that the shapes are equivalent.
I suspect that my confusion is particularly related to the way in which a generating function acts as a function. I welcome all insights.