It is said (and I myself have said) that in some cases the easiest way to prove a statement by mathematical induction is to prove a stronger statement by mathematical induction, because then one has a stronger induction hypothesis to use.
But then I ask myself: if a bright student were to ask me for some typical examples of that phenomenon, what would I say?
The only example that came to mind immediately when I thought of this question is Łos's theorem: A first-order sentence $\varphi$ is true in an ultraproduct $\left(\prod_{i\in I} A_i\right)/F$, where $F$ is an ultrafilter on the index set $I$, if and only if the set $\{i\in I : \varphi\text{ is true in}A_i\}$ is a member of $F$. The stronger statement speaks of first-order formulas (which may contain free variables) rather than of first-order sentences (which have no free variables). The proof is by induction on the formation of first order formulas, and it works since the class of first-order formulas is closed under certain operations and the class of first-order sentences is not.
That's not a great example for the situation I imagined.
Looking around m.s.e. a bit, I find Steven Stadnicki's answer to this question and my answer to this question, and maybe Martin Brandenburg's answer to this question.
This is not a great list of examples for illustrative purposes at an elementary level (although Steven Stadnick's answer would fit into such a list).
- If the purpose is to illustrate this phenomenon, which examples should be used, both at the most elementary levels and at more advanced levels?
- Is there a logician's viewpoint on this phenomenon? Might there be, for example, some idempotent mapping $T$ from the class of statements-that-are-weaker-versions-of-things-provable-by-induction to the class of things-provable-by-induction, where $T\varphi$ is in each case a generalization of $\varphi$?