A Little Philosophy
There’s a sense in which “real category theory” is what is preserved by equivalences of categories. If you aren’t familiar, an “equivalence” of categories is a weaker notion of “sameness” than equality of categories or isomorphism of categories. A relatively simple definition (among many definitions) of equivalence is as follows.
Definition: Let $C$ and $D$ be categories. We say that $C$ is equivalent to $D$, written $C \simeq D$ If and only if there is a functor $F:C \rightarrow D$ which is full, faithful, and essentially surjective.
I’m assuming you know what full and faithful functors are, but “essential surjectivity” may be new. To say that $F:C \rightarrow D$ is essentially surjective means that for every object $d \in D$, there is an object $c \in C$ such that $F(c) \cong d$. So for an object $d \in D$, it might not the case that $d$ is mapped to by $F$, but at least an object isomorphic to $d$ is mapped to.
It’s worth noting that this is strictly weaker than an isomorphism of categories. An example might be illustrative. Let Ord denote collection of all ordinals. By the axiom of choice, every set can be put in bijection with some ordinal. Let’s turn Ord into a category where morphisms are all set-functions between ordinals. That is, we’re taking a “full subcategory” of Set. We’re picking out a sub collection of objects, and keeping all the morphisms between them. With a little bit of work, one may show:
Theorem: There is an equivalence from Set to Ord.
I’ll leave it to you to prove this equivalence exists, but my remark about every every set being in bijective correspondence with some unique ordinal will be the crux of the proof. It’s even easier to show:
Theorem: Ord is not isomorphic to Set.
I again leave the proof to you.
As mentioned before, “real category theory” is the study of the properties of categories that are invariant under equivalence. One way of looking at this is the “principle of equivalence” (https://ncatlab.org/nlab/show/principle+of+equivalence). As the n-lab page points out, any categorical proof or construction that isn’t equivalence invariant is referred to as “evil”.
One corollary of this perspective is that any discussion of equality of objects is “evil”. When you’re thinking as a category theorist, you should avoid directly referring to equality of objects under as many circumstances as possible. To do otherwise is to be evil! Indeed, the equivalence functor from Set to Ord will take non-equal objects to equal ones.
Isomorphisms of objects, however, are trivial preserved by all functors (and hence by equivalences as well). So talking about isomorphic objects isn’t evil.
That was a long digression, but I promise there was a point. A representable functor $F:C^{\text{op}} \rightarrow \text{Set}$ is “representable” if and only if it is isomorphic to a contravariant hom functor $\text{hom}(-,c)$ for some object $c \in C$. This isomorphism is happening in the category $\text{Set}^{C^{\text{op}}} $ of functors from $C^{\text{op}}$ to Set. From the perspective of the principle of equivalence, being representable is the closest thing we have to being a contravariant hom functor. To get any more fine-grained is to be evil. From this perspective, being representable is to “might as well” be a hom functor, or to be able to be replaced by a hom functor in any evil-free proof or construction.
This is a long way of saying the importance and the definition of a representable functor is a bit subtle. The takeaway is as follows: It’s safe to think of a representable functor as being a hom functor for the purpose of almost any proof or construction. The interesting thing about representable functors is finding out that an otherwise-interesting functor is actually representable. It’s like finding out that something was “secretly” a hom functor all along.
Indeed, this philosophy is in line with what the other answers say. For example, they bring up the fact that every functor $F:C \rightarrow \text{Set}$ can be realized as a colimit of representable functors. Well, as a matter of fact colimits are only defined up to isomorphisms.
Alright, Now ignoring everything above, I’ll give a shot at an analogy. Keep in mind the “Google maps” intuition I gave for the contravariant hom functor I gave on your question over here (How do I think of the Hom functor?). Once again, I think this analogy is a stretch, but maybe it will be helpful again. This time though, we’re going to have to start with unpacking some definitions.
What Does it Mean For Two Set-Valued Functors to be Isomorphic?
Before we dive into an analogy, I want to make sure you really understand what it means for two set-valued contravariant functors to be isomorphic. Let $\mathcal{C}$ be a category. Let $F,G: \mathcal{C}^\text{op} \rightarrow \text{Set}$ be two set-valued contravariant functors on $\mathcal{C}$. What exactly does it mean for us to say that $F$ and $G$ are isomorphic?
Let’s focus on objects first. Let $c$ be an object of $\mathcal{C}$. Since $F$ and $G$ are isomorphic functors, there is an isomorphism $\phi_c:F(c) \rightarrow G(c)$. Recall that $F(c)$ and $G(c)$ are sets. What is an isomorphism of sets? It’s a bijection! So for every object $c$, we get a bijective set-map $\phi_c:F(c) \rightarrow G(c)$.
This doesn’t say very much though. Any two sets of the same cardinality have a bijection between them. The real “power” of the isomorphism comes from the fact that these bijections $\{\phi_c : c \in \mathcal{C} \}$ have to “play nicely” with the functor’s action of arrows.
So let $c$ and $d$ be two different objects in $\mathcal{C}$, and let $f:c \rightarrow d$ be an arrow in $\mathcal{C}$. What would it mean for these $\{\phi_c : c \in \mathcal{C} \}$ to “play nicely” with $f$? Since $F$ and $G$ are contravariant, we know that applying these functors to $f$ give us a pair of maps:
$$\begin{align*}F(f) & :F(d) \rightarrow F(c) \\ G(f) & : G(d) \rightarrow G(c) \end{align*}$$
But we already have maps $\phi_d: F(d) \rightarrow G(d)$ and $\phi_c:F(c) \rightarrow G(c)$. A “reasonable condition” for $f$ to play nicely with the maps $\{\phi_c : c \in \mathcal{C} \}$ would be to demand that:
$$\phi_c \circ F(f) = G(f) \circ \phi_d$$
These are both maps from $F(d) \rightarrow G(c)$. Since we have equality on the nose, we know that we’re getting literally the same set-map.
One way to think about what this means is to think of the collection $\{\phi_c : c \in \mathcal{C} \}$ as a dictionary that translates between two different languages. We have the “$F$ language” and the “$G$ language”. And if we start with $F(d)$, translate over to $G(d)$, and then apply the process $G(f)$, we get the exact same thing as if we first applied the process $F(f)$ and then translated. We get exactly the same information out, and nothing is lost or missing from translation.
An Analogy
Suppose that $F: \mathcal{C}^{\text{op}} \rightarrow \text{Set}$ is a representable functor. This means that there is some fixed object $c \in \mathcal{C}$ such that $F \cong \text{hom}_{\mathcal{C}}(-,c)$.
Recall from before, that we can think of $\mathcal{C}$ as your city, and the functor $\text{hom}(-,c)$ as google maps. For some other location $x$, we have that $\text{hom}(x,c)$ is the collection of routes from $x$ to $c$, and for an arrow $f: x \rightarrow y$ (thought of as a specific route from $x$ to $y$), the set-map $\text{hom}(f,c)$ takes in routes $y \rightarrow c$ adn spits out routes $x \rightarrow $ by “first taking $f$” (post-composition).
What does this tell us about the representable functor $F$? It tells us that for every $x$, $F(x)$ is a set that “encodes” all the different routes $x \rightarrow c$. It’s not literally the set of routes like we get from the hom functor, but it’s a “description” of those routes.
Have you ever had a friend or family member who is incapable of giving directions like an ordinary human being? Instead of being like “Oh yeah, go south on Main Street, then turn left on 1st Ave, and it’s two blocks down on your left”, they’re like “go straight on the big road. When you hit the the tree that kind of looks like Richard Nixon, take a left and keep going until the neighborhood starts looking a little gentrified. If you’d can smell bread you’ve gone too far.” These certainly aren’t directions, but they “encode” directions.
Think of a representable functor like talking to that friend instead of using Google maps. They aren’t describing routes and locations per-se, but they are saying something that can be translated into routes and locations. These translations are perfect — they contain all and exactly the information you need. You can translate back and forth without fail, but translation is needed.