Why are both the terms 'structure' and 'model' used in mathematical logic / model theory? Are they just holdovers from different subjects or is there a principled reason for having both?
For clarification, I'm not confused about any actual definitions or usages, just why both terms came to be used; I could, after all, survive perfectly well using exclusively one or the other with little chance of confusion.
Models are structures, and structures are models. But when we say "model" we mean that there is a particular theory which holds in the structure, and when we say "structure" we are mainly interested in an arbitrary interpretation of the language.
A structure is a set with some interpretable symbols(constants, relations and functions) within a fixed language. You do not ask for more from a structure.
However...
A model (of a theory) is a structure which satisfies the axioms of the theory. It makes more "structural sense"...
Maybe an example brings more clarification: Consider the theory of groups. $\mathbb Z$ is a structure in $\mathcal{L}=\{e, \cdot, ^{-1}\}$ but not a model since it is not a group. On the other hand, $\mathbb R- \{0\}$ is an $\mathcal{L}$-structure and further a model as it is indeed a group.
This is what I more or less know within a model-theoretic view. Someone else may give an answer also considering a perspective of universal algebra.
The term 'structure' is a replacement for the earlier term 'system' which was used by various authors (Weber, Hilbert, Dedekind) and meant something along the lines of "a set with added features". The change from 'system' to 'structure' occurred in the 1950's and seems to be owed to Abraham Robinson and Bourbaki. 'Model', on the other hand, appears in Tarski's early works (mid 1930's), and seems to have arisen entirely separately from 'system'. The use of both in modern model theory is, to the best of my knowledge, accidental with only minor intensional differences (as elaborated on in other answers) distinguishing them. There is no principled reason for having both.
One interesting approach to this problem is as follows. Structures contain the domain of discourse and interpretations of the symbols of a given language. Models add a valuation (assigment) function mapping variables to the elements of the domain. So one structure can give rise to infinitely many models. Since we are often not interested in models as such (after all, these are just various rearrangements of values given to the variables), some authors just do not bother with distinguishing models in this sense and talk only about variable assignments/valuations. And so the term 'model' is reused for 'structure' (for historical reasons we have model theory, not structure theory so there's a reason for keeping the name!). So the literature contains all sorts of approaches: models distinct from structures; models considered the same as structures; structures dissapearing altogether and only the notion of model being used in their stead. This used to confuse me no end in my early days but you have to remember that mathematical logic is a relatively young topic and we are witnesses of its growth and change.
There is no reason for introducing two different terms. Apparently, somebody introduced one term, and somebody else introduced a different term, either because he didn't like the first guy's term, or he hadn't heard of it. Or maybe it was the same guy and he changed his mind, or forgot what he called it before. How would I know, I'm not a historian (nor a mathematician).
The point is, in mathematics there is no official body with the power to decide what the terminology should be. This is different from other sciences, such as astronomy, where some organization claims the power to decide what's a planet. In mathematics, each writer goes his own way, and anarchy prevails. (If you think "model" vs. "structure" is bad, look at the terminology of graph theory.) Eventually, after a few centuries, a consensus is reached. Obviously, model theory (and graph theory) are too young to have reached that point.
