This is so-called material implication. The standard truth-table for $P\rightarrow Q$ has F when $P$ is true and $Q$ is false, and T for the other three cases. That's the same as the truth table for $\neg P\vee Q$.
This often seems unintuitive to beginners. On the other hand, it's hard to justify any other truth-table. The most natural alternative is to say that if $P$ is false, then $P\rightarrow Q$ is meaningless, or depends on exactly what $P$ and $Q$ are. But this causes technical problems.
A trace of the material conditional can be found in an English sentence like, "If that horse wins the race, then I'm a monkey's uncle." The speaker expects the antecedent to be false, so he wants the whole sentence to be an instance of F$\rightarrow$F, which is T according to the standard truth-table.
Another example, cribbed from one of the references below: "If the train is on time, then I'll be home by 10." Now suppose the train is late, but the speaker manages to make it home by 10 anyway. So we have an instance of F$\rightarrow$T. Do you want to say that the speaker's statement was false? That seems perverse. The only reasonable choices, it would seem, are either T or to say that the implication doesn't have a truth value at all.
You'll find more in Wikipedia ("Material Conditional: Philosophical Problems"), and a much more extensive discussion at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ("Indicative Conditionals" and "Relevance Logic").