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On p126 in §3. Extensions by Definitions in VIII Syntactic Interpretations and Normal Forms In Ebbinghaus' Mathematical Logic: $S$ is a (non-logical) symbol set

3.1 Definition. Let $\Phi$ be a set of $S$-sentences.

(a) Suppose $P \notin S$ is an $n$-ary relation symbol and $\phi_P(v_0, ... , v_{n-1})$ an $S$-formula. Then we say that $$ \forall v_0, .... \forall v_{n-1} (P v_0 ... n_{n-1} \leftrightarrow \phi_P(v_0, ... , v_{n-1})) $$ is an $S$-definition of $P$ in $\Phi$.

How is $\Phi$ used in the definition of a $S$-definition of $P$ in $\Phi$?

  • $\Phi$ is a set of $S$-sentences,

  • $\phi_P(v_0, ... , v_{n-1})$ is a $S$-formula, but not a $S$-sentence, so not in $\Phi$,

  • $P \notin S$, so $ P v_0 ... n_{n-1} $ and $ \forall v_0, .... \forall v_{n-1} (P v_0 ... n_{n-1} \leftrightarrow \phi_P(v_0, ... , v_{n-1})) $ are $S'$-sentences not $S$-sentences, so not in $\Phi$.

Thanks.

Tim
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1 Answers1

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What Definition 3.1(a) wants to convey is the following: say that you start with an axiom system $\Phi$ and you want have a way of "picking-up" $n$-tuples of elements in models $M$ of $\Phi$ which belong to a subset of $M^n$ satisfying some first order property given by an $S$-formula $\varphi_P(v_0, \dots, v_{n-1})$. To do so, one introduces a new $n$-ary relation symbol $P$ and extends the axiom system $\Phi$ to a new axiom system $\Phi \cup \{\delta_P\}$ in the new symbol set $S' = S \cup \{P\}$, where $$\delta_P := \forall v_0, .... \forall v_{n-1} (P v_0 ... n_{n-1} \leftrightarrow \varphi_P(v_0, ... , v_{n-1}));$$ the $S'$-sentence $\delta_P$ fixes the interpretation of the new symbol $P$ in models of $\Phi \cup \{\delta_p\}$. Now, the Theorem on Definitions (3.2) ensures us that we're not doing anything silly (namely, that both $\Phi$ and $\Phi \cup \{\delta_P\}$ prove the same theorems, so $\Phi \cup \{\delta_P\}$ is a conservative extension of $\Phi$) and that we really didn't had to add any new symbol to $S$ in order to pick-up those $n$-tuples of elements (i.e. $\varphi_P$ plays exactly the same role in models of $\Phi$ as $P$ does in models of $\Phi \cup \{\delta_P\}$).

The point is that to extend the symbol set $S$ by a new relation symbol $P$, there is no further condition which our axiom system $\Phi$ needs to satisfy, and that is why it seems as if $\Phi$ is not used in the definition of an $S$-definition for $P$. This is not however the case for the extension by definitions for constant symbols and function symbols. For the case of constant symbols one needs to ensure that the $S$-formula $\varphi_c$ defining the new constant symbol $c$ uniquely determines the interpretation of $c$ in models of $\Phi$, i.e. we need to impose the condition that $\Phi \models \exists^{=1}v_0\varphi_c(v_0)$. Definition 3.1(b) for the $S$-definition of a function symbol follows a similar idea.

Rick
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  • Thanks. Your way of using the word "axioms" reminded me of whether the axioms in any first order logic system belong to two different levels. https://math.stackexchange.com/questions/3773295/does-axiom-in-the-axioms-of-group-theory-mean-the-same-as-axiom-in-first-o – Tim Aug 20 '20 at 17:42