The thing is that a proper class is a collection of elements in a universe of set theory which is not a set, i.e. not an element of the universe.
It follows from the Russell's paradox that the collection of all sets is not a set, therefore a proper class.
However, suppose $V$ is a model of set theory, and $\langle M,E\rangle\in V$ is such that $M$ can be a model of set theory when thinking of $E$ as the epsilon relation for this model, then $M$ sees itself as a proper class, but $V$ - the larger universe - sees $M$ as a set.
On the other hand, consider $V$ is a model of set theory, it think of itself as a class, and consider its inner model $L$, the Godel universe of $V$, then $V$ thinks $L$ is a class as well, simply by the fact that the class of ordinals is embedded into $L$.
To conclude - a model of set theory always sees itself as a proper class. The way it sees other models, and they see it can be either as a set or as a class.
As for the collection of the ordinals this is simpler, as this is a well-ordered collection, so it must be isomorphic to some ordinal if it was a set, but then you have that it is a set which is a member of itself, therefore the collection of all ordinals is a proper class.
One more addendum: $V_\omega$ is indeed a model of $\mbox{ZFC}-\mbox{Infinity}$, however its existence as a set cannot be proved without the axiom of infinity, if you assume the existence of the empty set then you can build $V_\omega$ (by reiterating the power set operation) and have a model for the set theory of finitely-hereditary sets, which thinks of itself as a class, for the same reasons as above.