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I've recently taken an interest in the foundation of mathematics and have read a tiny bit about various type systems, Principia Mathematica, and logic.

Personally, I'm not a big believer in the idea that mathematics can be completely formalized. I understand that mathematicians don't really do proofs completely formally for practical reasons. That make me wonder about the current status of formalized mathematics. What areas of mathematics have been completely, mechanically formalized (in the sense that there's some formal framework, and a list of formal derivations somewhere inside of that framework that formalizes such an area).

I'm not really asking for different attempts/ways at formalization, which is what's been primarily answered here What is the current state of formalized mathematics?.

Wlod AA
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SpooFwen
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  • Why don't you think math can be completely formalized (in particular: what does that mean)? – Noah Schweber Nov 06 '18 at 20:57
  • @NoahSchweber, I don't think mathematics can be reduced to mechanical processes. It's hard to say what "mathematics" is to me-- I think of it as a specific class of mental constructs. The reason that I don't think mathematics can be formalized is similar to what Can I play with Mathness says. – SpooFwen Nov 06 '18 at 21:28
  • What he says feel "natural" to me (it's more or less what I think of math my entire life). I don't think I can come up with good reasons to defend it though, at least not yet. – SpooFwen Nov 06 '18 at 21:29

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Here is a table from the paper "Formal Proof" by Thomas Hales, Notices of the AMS 55(11), December 2008. It lists particular theorems, the year they were formalized, the formal theorem verifier used, the person responsible for the formal verification, and the person responsible for the original proof.

Here, as usual, "formalized" means that a proof sketch was developed which a theorem assistant was able to convert into a completely formalized proof, and then verify the formalized proof. I think it makes more sense to look at particular theorems, rather than "areas" of mathematics. Of course, to formalize a nontrivial theorem requires formalizing some amount of mathematics in the area of the theorem.

Year Theorem                     Proof System  Formalizer      Traditional Proof
1986 First Incompleteness        Boyer-Moore   Shankar         Gödel
1990 Quadratic Reciprocity       Boyer-Moore   Russinoff       Eisenstein
1996 Fundamental - of Calculus   HOL Light     Harrison        Henstock
2000 Fundamental - of Algebra    Mizar         Milewski        Brynski
2000 Fundamental - of Algebra    Coq           Geuvers et al.  Kneser
2004 Four-Color                  Coq           Gonthier        Robertson et al.
2004 Prime Number                Isabelle      Avigad et al.   Selberg-Erdös
2005 Jordan Curve                HOL Light     Hales           Thomassen
2005 Brouwer Fixed Point         HOL Light     Harrison        Kuhn
2006 Flyspeck I                  Isabelle      Bauer-Nipkow    Hales
2007 Cauchy Residue              HOL Light     Harrison        classical
2008 Prime Number                HOL Light     Harrison        analytic proof

Additional results after Hales' paper include the following (please feel welcome to update the list with significant theorems that have been formalized). Here another review https://hal.inria.fr/hal-00806920

Year Theorem                     Proof System  Formalizer     
2012 Feit-Thompson               Coq           Gonthier 
2017 Lax-Milgram                 Coq           Boldo & al
Carl Mummert
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  • This is mostly emphasizing the end of your second paragraph, but any one of these theorems would require formalizing and proving many other "workhorse" and "technical" theorems as well. Coq, Isabelle, and Mizar all have large libraries of formalized mathematics. – Derek Elkins left SE Nov 07 '18 at 00:06
  • This is very helpful and pretty much what I was looking for! I assume there's probably not a more complete list that I can find somewhere? I'll just have to dig around and make my own? – SpooFwen Nov 07 '18 at 01:52
  • The challenge is that each project is independent, so only an expository paper is likely to have a long and thorough list of many formalization projects. I suspect Hales tried to cover what he thought were the important ones by 2008, because a longer list would support his argument. – Carl Mummert Nov 07 '18 at 01:54
  • Thx for this list, I didn't know Cauchy Residue Theorem have been proved. You should however add Feit-Thomson to the list 2012 Coq Gonthier and also there is probably stuff coming out of the Coquelicot project of Sylvie Boldot – Can I play with Mathness Nov 07 '18 at 20:38
  • @Can I play with Mathness: Thanks. I have marked the post as "community wiki" to encourage everyone to add additional theorems to the list. The top table is directly from Hales' paper, so the bottom one can be used for additional results. – Carl Mummert Nov 07 '18 at 21:41
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The question as asked isn't really that meaningful. If "formalized in some way" means "logically sound and consistent", then everything that has a proof attached to it would count. There are a number of conjectures or postulates that are not proven (and so presumably wouldn't count as being "formalized" if I understand your sense of the word).

It's also interesting to note that there are the "big" conjectures (like the Riemann Hypothesis) that "everyone" knows about and knows haven't been proven, but there are so many small conjectures that either haven't been proven because no one has got to them yet, or are actually really tough problems but aren't widely known outside of small fields.

In terms of "difficult to formalize", I think that depends strongly on the problem, the mathematicians, and the techniques available. Think of the proof of Fermat's Last Theorem - this was fiendishly difficult to find and required the development of deep mathematics whose applications are much bigger than just that one theorem. In that sense, the proof of Fermat's theorem was "difficult". In another, though, it was "easy" once the appropriate mathematics were developed. It could have just been that Fermat's theorem was difficult because it was like trying to run before you can walk.

If what you mean is "for which mathematical statements are there known proofs" then the question is far too broad to answer. Keep in mind as well that mathematics isn't just "formalizations". There are also sets of methods and techniques to consider, some of which are beyond the scope of mathematics and might be considered instead to be some branch of logic.

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    Sorry if I sound too naive. What I mean by formalize is having a completely formal proof. Like what @Can I play with Mathness mentioned, mathematicians seem to consider only semi-formal proofs and take the faith that somewhere there's a completely formalized version. I'm wondering what the state of these completely formalized proofs is right now. – SpooFwen Nov 06 '18 at 20:40
  • Regarding Godel's incompleteness theorems, I've only really learned the proof and haven't looked much into it's implications and stuff. It's not entirely clear to me how it (in the specific way the theorem is stated) transfers to no one can absolutely find anyway to formalize arithmetic (sorry again if I sound naive!). – SpooFwen Nov 06 '18 at 20:40
  • "You shouldn't be a believer that mathematics can be completely formalized - it can't be, and this has been proven (formally!) in the incompleteness theorems." This only says that you can't formalize all of math in a single axiomatic system. And even that's not quite true, if you include "deep embedding theorems" like proving "ZFC proves X" in PA as "counting" as a formalization of X in PA (which mirrors mathematical practice more than you might think). With this definition it is really not clear to me that there is any math at all that can't be formalized in PA (or ZFC if you prefer). – Mario Carneiro Nov 06 '18 at 20:40
  • @MarioCarneiro Noted. I've removed that statement. It's not really that helpful anyway – Michael Stachowsky Nov 06 '18 at 21:13
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    @Mario What you claim there doesn't follow from the incompleteness theorem. There is no recursively enumerable, complete axiomatic system of sufficient strength. Once you drop the complexity requirement (which, of course, is undesirable) you can have complete theories. The question then becomes whether we can find some such (and how we would describe it, given that it isn't r.e.). – Stefan Mesken Nov 06 '18 at 21:32
  • @StefanMesken I usually assume implicitly that any axiomatization of interest is recursively enumerable; in fact I want the axiomhood predicate to be decidable and probably linear time. This is sufficient to encompass most real axiom systems, and the rest (i.e. true arithmetic) don't strike me as axiom systems at all but rather logical constructs that look kind of like axiomatic systems. (This is a philosophical position, I recognize that they meet the usual definition, but I'd prefer "recursively enumerable" to be a part of the definition of the term.) – Mario Carneiro Nov 07 '18 at 02:17
  • It is true that if you consider non-recursively enumerable theories T, it might be the case that T proves X but PA doesn't prove "T proves X". But I know no examples of mathematical proof "in the wild" that is done in a non-recursively enumerable theory (at least, as long as you go meta enough times). I'm not even sure a proof that violates this could be written down at all, because at some point the proof must be communicated in a finitistic way, in a journal with a finite number of pages, etc. – Mario Carneiro Nov 07 '18 at 02:22
  • @MarioCarneiro For any given proof, you only ever need a finite subtheory. So I don't see that as an issue. What is an issue, however, is to come up with a way to describe the theory in a way that it's sufficiently easy to isolate any finite subtheory you may be interested in for the sake of your proof. (An example I have in mind is the theory of $L(\mathbb{R})$ under large cardinal assumptions or, if you prefer, the theory of $L$.) – Stefan Mesken Nov 07 '18 at 09:48
  • @StefanMesken I think that advanced set theory is an especially good example of what I mean by "working at the meta level". No one actually proves theorems in L. They prove theorems in a weak base theory saying that ZFC or its extensions prove that some facts are "true in L". You can't directly prove theorems in L because it's not an axiom system, it's a model, so you have to go up a level, to ZFC, to actually have something to prove. And we often don't work in ZFC either because we often need to deal with metatheory stuff like V[G], so we go up once more, and now it's just PA(ish). – Mario Carneiro Nov 07 '18 at 10:39
  • @MarioCarneiro I take a sligthly different view as the same thing: To "prove something in $L$" you first establish that certain statements are true in $L$, then take a finite collection of these statements and prove that they imply your claim. (Although, in reality there is no such distinction. It's done in any order that feels natural.) – Stefan Mesken Nov 07 '18 at 11:06
  • This "Answer" should be a comment rather than an answer. – Wlod AA Sep 01 '22 at 03:45
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I believe that currently accepted proofs in common mathematics such as geometry, arithmetics, algebra,... are those that we believe can be reduced to ZFC by a (very) meticulous mathematicians,thus formalizable proofs. Although, as you know formalized mathematics is only a small subset of these maths.

I see two ways to answer "yes, some math cannot be formalized.".

  1. We might find some new type of (acceptable) reasoning that cannot be formalize at all. This is not even considered by any mathematician I know of. By acceptable, I mean that can be accepted as proof which is different from the way you found the proof.
  2. You might want to formalize the intuition of a proof, this is a different thing and I don't think formalization is an answer to that.
  • Is there any information on what areas of math have been completely formalized? This question was motivated by someone allegedly saying that mathematics up to 80 years ago have been formalized in HoTT. – SpooFwen Nov 06 '18 at 21:47
  • Undergrad algebra is fully formalized in CoQ, a lot of group theory, some basic analysis such as filtrations, Bessel functions..., Ruler and compass geometry for sure (and its generalization since hyperplane and hypersphere since its the same story behind). I don't know if anything is done for complex analysis, category theory should be easy enough but I don't know if it's done, ... – Can I play with Mathness Nov 06 '18 at 22:18
  • I don't know about HoTT, but I don't believe it since I don't know any formalization of Distributions theory for instance or even manifolds. To be precise, you DO have formalization of manifolds and I believe one could easily do some formalization of the basic definition (take any graduate math text book and you can formalize the first few pages), however, the proof will be more and more intricate if you don't have a solid computer proof system capable of "scaling". – Can I play with Mathness Nov 06 '18 at 22:25
  • If you take a day or two to prove the prime number theorem in CoQ you will be suprised by the meaningless details you have to specify. The higher you go, the much such details you have to specify. 80 years ago, you had distributions, riemanian manifold and many many PDE's. I don't believe for a second computer formalization had reach anything close to handling full proofs in these area. The best I have seen so far are very helpful algorithm for computations and undergraduate algebra proving system. – Can I play with Mathness Nov 06 '18 at 22:25
  • The question was "what areas of mathematics have been completely, mechanically formalized?" This is not a yes/no question or a question that one should answer with "I believe". – Jonathan Julián Huerta Mar 21 '21 at 16:06