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Rayo's function defined in English:

"$\operatorname{Rayo}(n)$ is the smallest positive integer bigger than any finite positive integer named by an expression in the language of first order set theory with $n$ symbols or less."

More formally, we make use of the following second-order formula (Sat):

∀R {
{for any (coded) formula [ψ] and any variable assignment t
(R( [ψ],t) ↔
( ([ψ] = `x_i ∈ x_j' ∧ t(x_1) ∈ t(x_j)) ∨
([ψ] = `x_i = x_j' ∧ t(x_1) = t(x_j)) ∨
([ψ] = `(∼θ)' ∧ ∼R([θ],t)) ∨
([ψ] = `(θ∧ξ)' ∧ R([θ],t) ∧ R([ξ],t)) ∨
([ψ] = `∃x_i (θ)' and, for some an xi-variant t' of t, R([θ],t'))
)} →
R([φ],s)}

where [φ] is a Gödel-coded formula and s is a variable assignment.

We then define $\operatorname{Rayo}(n)$ as:

The smallest number bigger than every finite number m with the following property: there is a formula φ(x) in the language of first-order set-theory (as presented in the definition of `Sat') with less than or equal to $n$ symbols and x as its only free variable such that: (a) there is a variable assignment s assigning m to x such that Sat([φ(x)],s), and (b) for any variable assignment t, if Sat([φ(x)],t), then t assigns m to x.

I do wonder, how many values of this function are explicitly known or have good bounds? For example, for $0\le n<10$, I speculate that $\operatorname{Rayo}(n)=0$, since it takes, I believe, ten symbols to write zero. Once we write zero, we get $\operatorname{Rayo}(10)=1$, and so on. So how many values can we reach?


I have not seen any good references for this.


Related: Is Rayo's number really that big?

  • You should probably include the formal definition of Rayo's function, since that specifies precisely the language of first order set theory to be used. – Deedlit Mar 23 '17 at 01:35
  • Thank you for bringing this topic to my attention. I never even knew sequences could grow this fast. Could any such bound beat Graham's number? – Sarvesh Ravichandran Iyer Mar 23 '17 at 01:35
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    It should beat Graham's number very easily - maybe in less than 100 characters. – Deedlit Mar 23 '17 at 01:37
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    Still, you need a definition of formula to make sense of this. How does bracketing work, for example? Is $x=y$ a formula or does it have to be $(x=y)$, can I write $\lnot x=y$ or $\lnot (x=y)$, etc. Also, it would be nice to state what the formula does. (Below in the text it refers to a formula "Sat" which is never defined, it would be nice to define it like this). – martin.koeberl Mar 23 '17 at 02:24
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    Why is this tagged set theory? – Asaf Karagila Mar 23 '17 at 10:01
  • @martin.koeberl I believe Sat is defined by the gray text. Likewise, explanations on parentheses and all that are in the link. – Simply Beautiful Art Mar 23 '17 at 10:43
  • @AsafKaragila I thought it might be relevant. If you see it unfit, you may remove that tag. – Simply Beautiful Art Mar 23 '17 at 10:53
  • @астонвіллаолофмэллбэрг once you define recursion... – Simply Beautiful Art Mar 23 '17 at 11:10
  • I know that that's the definition but you should say it. Sorry but I don't want to search in the link for the definition of formula used here. It should be in the question. – martin.koeberl Mar 23 '17 at 12:25

1 Answers1

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Your question is about what I view as the definable-in-set-theory analogue of the busy beaver problem. I had previously posted an answer on MathOverflow to the corresponding question concerning what I view as the definable-in-arithmetic analogue of the busy-beaver function. The main conclusion there was that this function has a growth rate exceeding any arithmetically definable function, and furthermore, that the function is not itself arithmetically definable.

A similar analysis works for your function.

The first thing to notice is that what you call the Rayo function is not definable in the first-order language of set theory. Basically, you haven't actually defined a function, because the concept of which numbers are definable or not is not expressible in the same language.

But in second-order set theory, or at least in the set theory having a proper class truth predicate, then we can define the Rayo function, by reference to that truth predicate. Such a predicate, for example, is provable in Kelley-Morse set theory, as I explain in my blog post Kelley-Morse implies con(ZFC) and much more.

So let us work in the theory GBC + Tr is a satisfaction class or truth predicate for first-order set-theoretic truth. With this class, the Rayo function $R(n)$ is definable, since we can refer to the truth predicate to find out which functions are definable.

Theorem. The function $R(n)$ eventually dominates every set-theoretically definable function.

Proof. Suppose that $f:\mathbb{N}\to\mathbb{N}$ is a set-theoretically definable function, so that the relation $f(x)=y$ is definable in the language of set theory by some formula $\varphi(x,y)$.

Notice that with the powers of two, we can easily define large numbers with comparatively small formulas. For example, $2^n$ is definable by a formula of size $n+c$ for some constant $c$. Put differently, and by iterating this, for any sufficiently large $k$ we can define a number $k^+$ larger than $k$ with a formula smaller than $\log(\log(k))$.

Therefore, if $k$ is very large with respect to these constants and the size of the definition of $f$, then we can define $\max_{x\leq k^+}f(x)$ using a formula of size less than $k$. Thus, $f(k)\leq R(k)$, as desired. QED

Corollary. It is not possible to provide a first-order set-theoretic definition of the Rayo function.

Proof. If you could define it, then add one, and this would be a definable function not dominated by the Rayo function, contrary to the previous theorem. QED

In particular, we cannot define this function in ZFC set theory, and I don't find it meaningful to talk about the Rayo function in a general mathematical context without further specifying the foundational context, such as whether there is a truth predicate available or not.

For example, the formal definition that you provided from the link involves a second-order quantifier $\forall R$, but it will not work in all models of second-order set theory GBC, since it presumes that there is a truth function. But it will work in Kelley-Morse set theory or in GBC + Truth predicate. One can improve the definition somewhat by asking for $R$ to be only a partial satisfaction class, defined on all formulas of complexity less than $n$, and then you'll get a definition that works in GBC, but it will not be provably total, although it will be defined on the standard finite numbers. But GBC is not strong enough with separation for the function to exist as a set, since it is being defined with a second-order quantifier.

Meanwhile, however, your actual question is about small values of $n$, and in this case, if one is referring only to a bounded part of the Rayo function, then the question is perfectly sensible, since for every particular finite $n$, we have a $\Sigma_n$ truth predicate and a way of referring to truth defined by formulas of size at most $n$. And so one can still hope to prove lower bounds for $R(n)$ for various small values of $n$.

In particular, for the Rayo number itself, which takes $n$ as a googol symbols, the function is definable.

But let me point out further that once $n$ gets to have sufficient size, then the values of $R(n)$ will become independent of ZFC. For example, in set theory, we can define a number $k$ to be the smallest such that $2^\omega$ has size $\aleph_k$, if there is such a finite number $k$, and otherwise $0$. The point now is that this defines a definite number in set theory, but ZFC does not settle what the value is or provide any upper bound in the natural numbers. For this reason, after a few steps, the nature of the function $R(n)$ becomes completely wrapped up in the meta-mathematical foundational issues I have alluded to earlier.

In particular, since I believe that the definition I provided can be made formally in fewer than a googol symbols, the particular value of Rayo's number, R(googol), is independent of ZFC, and no upper bound can be proved in ZFC for it.

JDH
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    Sadly my question still stands, though as you say, it will be nearly impossible to determine if a given value is the corresponding output of Rayo's function. Any idea on an upper-bound to $n$ such that $\operatorname{Rayo}(n)$ is reasonably determinable? – Simply Beautiful Art Apr 15 '17 at 23:15
  • Hm, so I'm no expert in this field, which leaves me to wonder what I'm doing. Nonetheless, great answer, and thanks for the nice explanations. – Simply Beautiful Art Apr 15 '17 at 23:18
  • Determining bounds on where the independence comes in will depend on syntax details and exactly how you count things. But I think that about a page of symbols should be more than enough to reach the problematic stages. – JDH Apr 15 '17 at 23:18
  • Let me add that I am sorry I couldn't answer your question about very small numbers, which is of course the main thing you asked about, and so I apologize. – JDH Apr 15 '17 at 23:19
  • No problem, this is worthy of an answer, and it highlights what makes this problem so difficult. Not to mention, I doubt someone wants to sit down and calculate all possible values of Rayo's function under a given amount of symbols. That would just be painful. – Simply Beautiful Art Apr 15 '17 at 23:21
  • I think saying "it isn't arithmetically definable" is error-prone – reuns Apr 15 '17 at 23:21
  • @user1952009 I'm not sure I understand your comment. The arithmetic hierarchy is an intensely studied hierarchy of complexity, and fairly deeply understood. So I'm not sure to which errors you refer. Meanwhile, one should not analyze the arithmetic hierarchy from within arithmetic, of course, but from a stronger foundation, since the main features will not be arithmetically expressible. But we can define the arithmetic sets and so on in set theory. It is a similar issue with the OP's question, where we cannot define definability in set theory, but we can in strong enough class theories. – JDH Apr 16 '17 at 00:24
  • I don't understand how your example has relation to Rayo's number. Any truth predicate of the form "The k such that $\aleph_k=2^{{\aleph}_0}$" will have multiple models and thus it won't be true that there is a unique assignment in which the formula is satisfied. – exfret Sep 05 '17 at 05:13
  • @exfret I used that concept (which isn't a "truth predicate"; you are using the terminology incorrectly) to make a certain definition of a number. ZFC proves that my definition defines a single number. But there is no particular number that ZFC proves is that number---it is independent of the axioms, and it is consistent with ZFC that it is as big as you like. Since my definition uses less than a googol symbols, it follows that ZFC cannot prove any upper bound for Rayo's number, since Rayo's number must be at least as large as the number defined by my number, whatever it is. – JDH Sep 05 '17 at 11:00
  • @JDH Sorry I was being absent-minded when I said "truth predicate". Also, my point was that even though ZFC proves that k has a single value in any given model, my understanding of the notion of a "number definable in n symbols" in the description of Rayo's number was that such a number, m, has the property that there is a proposition $P(x)$ with a single free variable x such that every variable assignment and thus every model in which $P(x)$ is satisfied has $x=m$. As you point out, the k in your formula could take many different values. While I agree that ZFC is not strong enough... – exfret Sep 05 '17 at 20:07
  • No, you are confused about what it means to define something in set theory. By your criteria, for example, the set of real numbers would not be definable, since it isn't the same in all models; the ordinal number $\omega$ would not be definable, since it isn't the same in all models; the set of even natural numbers or the primes would not be definable, since it isn't the same in all models (because of nonstandard models). But all these things are of course definable in set theory, defined in the usual ways we define them, even though they can differ in different models. – JDH Sep 05 '17 at 20:13
  • ...to have the ability to reason about formulas long enough to encode statements such as the ones you give, I still take issue with your statement that Rayo's number can be made arbitrarily large (which would imply that its value is not well-defined). As I understand it, Rayo's number is in fact well-defined since we must only take statements in which every variable assignment satisfying our formula assigns the same unique natural number to the free variable in it. – exfret Sep 05 '17 at 20:14
  • @JDH I was trying to describe the notion of "definable" as I understand Rayo's function uses it. I was thinking that if we fix a structure which we call the natural numbers (using the standard construction $S(n)={n}\cup{n}$ and $0={}$), then we can create formulas which are satisfied by a unique element of this structure for any model and variable assignment. Otherwise, Rayo's function would be not well-defined and thus not a function at all. Also, if you want we can move this to chat so the comments don't get too much more clogged (I'm not sure what the exact procedure is for this). – exfret Sep 05 '17 at 20:40
  • I think you've misunderstood Rayo's definition. He is referring to truth in the set-theoretic universe (not the natural numbers), and the class R is a truth function, for the clauses in the definition assert that R obeys the Tarskian recursion, and the final clause asserts that phi is true of s, according to the truth predicate R. – JDH Sep 06 '17 at 00:59
  • When I said that Rayo's number can be arbitrarily large, what I meant was that although Rayo's number is provably a specific single number, defined by Rayo's definition, nevertheless for any particular number $k$ (a number in the meta-theory), it is consistent with the axioms of set theory that Rayo's number is larger than $k$. This is the sense in which ZFC and even stronger set theories do not settle the particular value of Rayo's number. The exact value of this number is independent of ZFC. – JDH Sep 06 '17 at 01:01