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This question already has an answer here. That answer is abstract. Could you help me with some not-so-abstract examples of what the answerer is talking about? For example, give examples of hyperreal numbers which are written as numbers, if that is possible.

Another examples that I would like to understand are these statements:

Hyperreal numbers extend the reals. As well, real numbers form a subset of the hyperreal numbers.

I've not yet studied mathematics at university level.

Andreas
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The usual construction of the hyperreal numbers is as sequences of real numbers with respect to an equivalence relation. For example, the real number 7 can be represented as a hyperreal number by the sequence $(7,7,7,7,7,\ldots)$, but it can also be represented by the sequence $(7,3,7,7,7,\ldots)$ (that is, an infinite number of 7s but with one 7 replaced by the number 3). Any real number $x$ can be represented as a hyperreal number by the sequence $(x,x,x,\ldots)$. An example of an infinitesimal is given by the sequence $(1,1/2,1/3,1/4,\ldots)$, which happens to be a sequence of numbers converging to $0$. An example of an infinite number in the hyperreals is given by the sequence $(1,2,3,4,\ldots)$.

The equivalence relation is a bit complicated so I won't tell you how it works but just tell you one exists, and that for any sequence of numbers there are many other sequences that correspond to the same hyperreal number. This is analogous to the construction of the rational numbers as numbers of the form $a/b$ where $a$ and $b\neq 0$ are integers, where for instance $2/6$ and $1/3$ are considered equivalent as rational numbers. The equivalence relation for rational numbers is quite simple, but I'll mention that the equivalence relation for hyperreal numbers is not constructive (it uses the axiom of choice), so it is not in general possible to tell whether two sequences are equivalent as hyperreal numbers.

When actually working with hyperreal numbers however, how they were constructed is not important (whether by the method of identifying different sequences of real numbers as above, or otherwise), and the real number 7 is simply called 7 in the hyperreal numbers, and whenever an infinitesimal is needed, one might simply call it $\varepsilon$ with no regard for which specific infinitesimal it is.

Samuel
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    I think this is slightly misleading - there isn't one equivalence relation! Any nonprincipal ultrafilter yields an equivalence relation which works, and different ultrafilters yield different equivalence relations. For example, there's no way to say at the outset whether $(1, 1, {1\over 2}, {1\over 2}, {1\over 3}, {1\over 3}, {1\over 4}, {1\over 4}, ...)$ is less than $(2, {1\over 2}, 1, {1\over 3}, {1\over 2}, {1\over 4}, {1\over 3}, {1\over 5}, ...)$, since they alternate being larger and smaller than each other. – Noah Schweber Feb 08 '17 at 18:32
  • I didn't say there was only one, but I could probably have been clearer. Good point. – Samuel Feb 08 '17 at 18:36
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    You're quite right, you didn't (and your answer is really good - I upvoted) - I just wanted to point it out explicitly since it's really weird. In particular, in the sentence "The equivalence relation is a bit complicated so I won't tell you how it works but just tell you one exists", the second clause indicates that there is more than one, but the first suggests that there is a unique one by using "the". – Noah Schweber Feb 08 '17 at 18:38
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    This answer strongly reminds me of the section on "real numbers" in Wildberger's paper, with the difference that you don't seem to recognize the imprecision involved in hiding an arbitrary infinite unspecifiable sequence in "...". – Wildcard Feb 09 '17 at 07:32
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    @Wildcard: It is a standard convention in mathematics to write ellipses after a unique sequence if the pattern is considered obvious. – Samuel Feb 09 '17 at 08:02
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Unfortunately, there is no "concrete" description of the hyperreals. For instance, there is no way to give a concrete description of any specific infinitesimal: the infinitesimals tend to be "indistinguishable" from each other. (It takes a bit of work to make this claim precise, but in general, distinct infinitesimals may share all the same definable properties. Contrast that with real numbers, which we can always "tell apart" by finding some rational - which is easy to describe! - in between them; actually, that just amounts to looking at their decimal expansions, and noticing a place where they differ!)

Similarly, the whole object "the field of hyperreals" is a pretty mysterious object: it's not unique in any good sense (so speaking of "the hyperreals" is really not correct), and it takes some serious mathematics to show that it even exists, much more than is required for constructing the reals.

While the hyperreals yield much more intuitive proofs of many theorems of analysis, as a structure they are much less intuitive in my opinion, largely for the reasons above.


To answer your other question, yes, the reals are (isomorphic to) a subset of (any version of) the hyperreals; that's what's meant by saying that the hyperreals extend the reals.

Noah Schweber
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  • Comments are not for extended discussion; this conversation has been moved to chat. – user642796 Feb 09 '17 at 10:30
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    "Any time I have two positive infinitesimals, they have all the same properties." This doesn't seem to make sense — if $f(x)=\sin(1/x)$, and $f^$ is its natural extension to the hyperreals, then there exist two infinitesimals $\epsilon_0$ and $\epsilon_1$ such that $f^(\epsilon_0)=0$ and $f^*(\epsilon_1)=1$. This distinguishes them. – Akiva Weinberger Feb 09 '17 at 17:03
  • @AkivaWeinberger Quite right. I was being informal - my point was that if you pick a "generic" infinitesimal, there's no way to distinguish it from another "generic" infinitesimal. But what I wrote above was misleading. I've corrected it. – Noah Schweber Feb 09 '17 at 17:22
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    :: there is no "concrete" description of the hyperreals. This is a common delusion. Paper by Kanovei-Shelah in JSL 69 (2004), 159-164, presents an explicit construction of hyperreals with no reference to unspecified choice of anything (say an ultrafilter), as "concrete" as say the Dedekind construction of reals themselves. – Vladimir Kanovei Mar 06 '17 at 08:57
  • Noah, my main problem with your answer is that it does not address the question which is formulated at freshman calculus level. What is the point of dragging in things like the categoricity of the theory of the reals? This is not an issue accessible to the OP. Furthermore, the said categoricity is less than it is advertized to be, since it patently depends on the choice of the background model of set theory, so that the reals can only be said to be the "unique" complete ordered field modulo such a choice. Also see the comment on Nelson in my answer above. – Mikhail Katz Mar 06 '17 at 09:02
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    @VladimirKanovei I am of course aware of your paper, and I believe I've mentioned it in previous answers on this site. However, I strongly disagree with your comment. It is not concrete in my opinion (while being really mathematically interesting!), and certainly not nearly as concrete as the Dedekind construction of the reals: I can explain the Dedekind construction (informally) to a sharp high-school student, but are you really telling me that if a student asked, "I get that we suppose the existence of a hyperreal field, but what is it?", you'd respond with that? (cont'd) – Noah Schweber Mar 06 '17 at 13:42
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    I think there's a real distinction here - between concreteness as a mathematical property (I'd argue that there is a precise sense in which your construction is indeed concrete, at least within ZF), versus concreteness as an intuitive property - and that your comment elides that distinction. In particular, while your construction doesn't involve a choice of ultrafilters, it does involve ultrafilters themselves - it's fundamentally (non-naively) set-theoretic in a way Dedekind is not (D. is of course naively set-theoretic). (Incidentally I don't really appreciate the word "delusion".) – Noah Schweber Mar 06 '17 at 13:45
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    @MikhailKatz I disagree. First of all, I think categoricity is relevant here - it certainly was to me when a friend was trying to explain the hyperreals to me when I was a junior in high school. Of course I didn't use the word, but the point was that in asking the question "What is the hyperreal field?" (as opposed to "What's the real field?") I was doomed to disappointment (as I was with related questions). Categoricity, while an advanced topic, gets at a fundamental property of number systems which the reals have and the hyperreals lack and which I as a student found important (cont) – Noah Schweber Mar 06 '17 at 13:51
  • @NoahSchweber, what I object to here is moving the goalposts in the following sense. Objections to a theory should be raised in a way consistent with the framework you are working with. If you are in a traditional Weierstrassian framework, then you will be asking questions like "is the field unique up to isomorphism?" and then the question is affirmative modulo CH. This happens to be a foundational axiom accepted by many people though by no means all. For example it is accepted by Alain Connes which did not prevent him from badmouthing nonstandard analysis, mainly with the goal of advancing – Mikhail Katz Mar 06 '17 at 13:56
  • And I'm sorry, but I find the point that categoricity is dependent on the model we're working in to be missing the point. First of all, basically everything depends on the background model of set theory, so this is a pretty vacuous objection. More importantly, though, work in "naive" (or actual) mathematics; we have of course a satisfying proof that the reals are categorical, while the hyperreals very much are not. This is a mathematical distinction, not a set-theoretic one, and bringing too much set theory into it muddies things (I say this as a set theorist interested in such things). – Noah Schweber Mar 06 '17 at 13:56
  • ...of advancing his owh theory of infinitesimals in the 1990s. If on the other hand you are working in Robinson's framework, then the appropriate question would be, does one have uniqueness of the field when relevant properties in the context of Robinson's framework are taken into account, such as saturation. And then the answer is affirmative also: Keisler provided natural axiomatisations that characterize the hyperreals uniquely. I understand he is currently your colleague so you can ask him about this. – Mikhail Katz Mar 06 '17 at 13:57
  • @MikhailKatz " and then the question is affirmative modulo CH" I think this is wrong - while CH implies that any two hyperreal fields constructed as ultrapowers on $\mathbb{N}$ of the reals are isomorphic, there are hyperreal fields (that is, non-Archimedean ordered fields extending the reals and satisfying a transfer principle) of arbitrarily large cardinality, regardless of CH. – Noah Schweber Mar 06 '17 at 13:58
  • In sum, the point is that procedurally speaking as far as the OP's concerns in freshman calculus are concerned, categoricity is far less relevant than at the research level. If you were bothered by this when you were a freshman well perhaps you were destined to become a logician :-) but not everybody is. And as I said Keisler did provide a satisfactory answer. – Mikhail Katz Mar 06 '17 at 13:59
  • About CH: I am obviously talking about countable index set, which is, let's admit it, a natural assumption. – Mikhail Katz Mar 06 '17 at 14:00
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    @MikhailKatz I admit no such thing! That amounts to the commitment that by "hyperreal field" you mean ultrapower along $\mathbb{N}$ - how exactly are you going to explain that to a student? "Non-Archimedean field extension of $\mathbb{R}$ satisfying transfer" is at least something that can be explained somewhat well (of course not using those words, but it is explainable), but there's no way you're going to get ultrapowers in there for any but the most advanced of students. So that's a mathematically interesting assumption, but totally unnatural from a pedagogical perspective. – Noah Schweber Mar 06 '17 at 14:03
  • (And I believe Keisler's answer also only works under that assumption, but I could be wrong - let me know.) In fact, in my opinion restricting attention to ultrapowers in the first place is not a natural assumption from a pedagogical perspective. Incidentally, nowhere in my answer did I use the word "categoricity" - what I said was " it's not unique in any good sense," which I think definitely is something you can say to a student. – Noah Schweber Mar 06 '17 at 14:03
  • Noah, generally speaking, the flexibility of a mathematical theory is considered an advantage rather than a shortcoming. Here it is in Robinson's framework you have a vast array of possible field extensions that can be chosen according to the application desired, and the degree of saturation desired. Why is it that in Robinson's case all of a sudden people seek to dress down a feature to look like a bug, to reverse a familiar saying from computer slang? – Mikhail Katz Mar 06 '17 at 14:06
  • @MikhailKatz "Flexibility of a theory" is a very different thing from "unspecifiability of an object." If I'm going to care about a mathematical object, I want to know what it is. So while I find the class of hyperreal fields to be interesting, I don't find any individual hyperreal field to be particularly intuitively compelling (which is not to say that I don't find any mathematically compelling - the KS-example is really cool!). It's important to distinguish between the theory and the object. I am all for flexible theories; I'm objecting to denotational vagueness. (cont'd) – Noah Schweber Mar 06 '17 at 14:11
  • I think elsewhere (EDIT: here) I've said, in fact, that I find the techniques of NSA to be fairly intuitively compelling; my issue is definitely not the flexibility of the theory. Anyways, I think we're not going to get anywhere in this thread; I believe I've made my position clear, and I think I understand yours. You are welcome to downvote my answer if you feel it warrants it, but at this point I think it's best for me to bow out of this conversation. – Noah Schweber Mar 06 '17 at 14:13
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    @Noah Schweber. I withdraw the word `delusion' wrt youself. On the other hand, clearly there exist mathematical constructions that can be explained to a high-school student, as well as those which can be explained to a dweller of international subject-oriented meetings (to which I believe the K-Shel const belongs), as well as those which (as eg the proof of LFT) require a devoted weeks-long attention of top-world specialists. This distinction has nothing to do with the level of concreteness, but rather is related to the level of complexity. These are two clearly different properties. – Vladimir Kanovei Mar 06 '17 at 14:27
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    @MikhailKatz I apologize, my previous comment was out of line, and I've deleted it. But I do find your previous comment pretty obnoxious. I have to ask - is there any way to politely leave a conversation that you won't take as a sign of weakness or of scholarly dishonesty? I really have enjoyed our conversations on this topic, but if I can't leave them (as one is allowed to leave conversations!) I'm not excited about joining them in the future. – Noah Schweber Mar 06 '17 at 15:27
  • To clarify, it's not that I find the topic uninteresting or am unwilling to defend my positions, but: (a) I have other things to do, (b) comment threads aren't the place for extended discussion (emailing me would get better results, although I can't promise to respond in a timely manner), and (c) I do think our discussion here has reached the point of diminishing returns appropriate for its setting: I think we've each made our positions clear, so that the OP can understand each, and that more discussion would be between ourselves rather than for the OP. – Noah Schweber Mar 06 '17 at 15:32
  • @Noah, your answer make certain claims about Robinson's framework that I find questionable. I think it is appropriate by MSE standards to challenge views one finds questionable in a courteous fashion based on proper sources and not opinions. If you don't wish to have your views challenged you can always delete your answer. Just to be perfectly clear this is not a course of action I am recommending, but if you formulate views you have to be ready to defend them. – Mikhail Katz Mar 06 '17 at 15:34
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    @MikhailKatz "if you formulate views you have to be ready to defend them." I've expended serious effort in this comment thread defending my views. Incidentally, you haven't responded at all to my criticism of using ultrapowers as the "natural" context for NSA, which was important for your response to my objections re: categoricity. But I don't demand that you respond to all my questions - I recognize that this is a specific forum, and that lengthy discussion is inappropriate for it. Please treat me with the basic courtesy you would expect from someone who honestly disagrees with you. – Noah Schweber Mar 06 '17 at 15:38
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    I have to admit that I do not understand why "standard" real numbers are percieved as something "concrete". In the notorious "for every epsilon > 0 there exists delta", do we always know, or can compute, this delta? What is the meaning of the word "concrete" in this discussion? – Alexandre Borovik Mar 07 '17 at 06:39
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    @AlexandreBorovik By "concrete," I mean that (a) I can give a satisfying answer to a student who asks for an example of a real number, and (b) I can give a satisfying answer to a student who asks how to tell two different reals apart (and tell which is bigger than the other). In the case of the hyperreals, unless the student is sufficiently advanced in logic I can't do this - I can arguably do the former (if the hyperreals are an ultrapower, then a hyperreal is an equivalence class of sequences of reals, and I can describe such a sequence) but how do I compare hyperreals? (cont'd) – Noah Schweber Mar 07 '17 at 13:29
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    I know that the sequences $(0, 1, 0, 1, ...)$ and $(1, 0, 1, 0, ...)$ correspond to different hyperreals, but which is bigger? At the end of the day, the student is forced to accept a high level of abstraction - individual hyperreals are things that are fundamentally mysterious, in a way that real numbers are not. This is something I've never heard a good answer to, regardless who I ask: how does one respond to this question from a student? (Meanwhile, the epsilon-delta definition is not part of the definition of reals, but rather of continuity, so I don't see its point here.) (cont'd) – Noah Schweber Mar 07 '17 at 13:35
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    We can go further in this direction. One possible response to the question of which of the two sequences above is bigger is, "It depends what ultrafilter we pick." (OK, this isn't what one would say to the student verbatim - but something morally similar, "It depends exactly how we build the hyperreals" or something.) Well, bringing this up pushes back against the idea that by giving a representative sequence, we have actually named a hyperreal, since that name by itself is not enough to tell us how the hyperreal behaves. (cont'd) – Noah Schweber Mar 07 '17 at 13:41
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    And in fact I can make this mathematically precise, and prove it. Both real numbers and representative sequences for hyperreals can be effectively coded as infinite sequences of zeroes and ones (in the latter case, by "zigzagging" through the array of the sequences corresponding to the terms of the representative sequence). Actually, this goes the other way: each infinite sequence codes a number of the appropriate type. Now let's look at the reals. There is a single Turing machine $T$ such that, if I give it as oracles sequences $\alpha$ and $\beta$ corresponding to distinct reals, (cont'd) – Noah Schweber Mar 07 '17 at 13:44
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    $T$ will tell me which corresponds to the larger real. (If I happen to give it two sequences corresponding to the same real, it will of course never halt.) Meanwhile, there is provably no such machine for hyperreal representations, since given any two finite sequences $\sigma, \tau$ of reals there are infinite sequences $f, g$ of reals which - when viewed as representatives of hyperreals - satisfy $f<g$. Similarly, equality of reals is explicitly co-computably enumerable, whereas equality of hyperreals provably is not. (cont'd) – Noah Schweber Mar 07 '17 at 13:49
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    Note that I've focused on the hyperreals (or on individual hyperreals) as an object(s), not NSA as a method. I distinguish between these. NSA is in many ways more concrete than classical analysis - in particular, the $\epsilon-\delta$ definition of continuity is too abstract for many students (although personally I found it far more satisfying than the description via infinitesimals). And I've said this elsewhere on this site. But the question asked "What are hyperreal numbers?" and so that's the thing who's concreteness I'm interested in here. And they are pretty mysterious things. – Noah Schweber Mar 07 '17 at 14:03
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Assuming you mean your question in the practical sense rather than about doing logical foundations... picture in your mind the real numbers: that picture is exactly how the hyperreal numbers look.

I'm not even exaggerating. The hyperreal numbers, along with the rest of the nonstandard model of mathematics they're contained in, is carefully designed to have exactly the same properties that the real numbers do within the standard model.

In fact, in some philosophical approaches to the subject (e.g. how one might interpret internal set theory), it's the hyperreals within the nonstandard model that is actually what mathematicians have been studying for the past few millenia.


Except for a few esoteric applications, one only considers the hyperreals in the context of nonstandard analysis, which is all about making comparisons between standard model and a nonstandard model. One can't get the flavor of NSA by asking "what do the hyperreals look like?" — one has to ask the question "how do the reals and hyperreals compare?".

In the usual formulations, the main distinctive feature is that every real number is also a hyperreal number, and that all of the finite hyperreals can be partitioned according to their standard part.

That is, if $x$ is a finite hyperreal, there is some real $r$ such that $r-x$ is an infinitesimal hyperreal.

Phrased conversely, to each real number $r$ there is a halo of hyperreals surrounding $r$ that are an infinitesimal distance from $r$, and these halos partition the finite hyperreals.

If you are willing to continue on to the extended real numbers (i.e. $\pm \infty$), then the nonfinite hyperreals lie in the halos* of $\pm \infty$ depending on whether they are positive or negative.

Keisler's book uses the analogy of a microscope. At one level, you're studying the standard reals, and at any time you may pick a real and "zoom in" to look at its halo of nonstandard reals with that standard part.

*: Be careful that some sources define halo in a different way so that this statement is no longer true.

  • @Noah: The monad of $+\infty$ is the intersection of all standard open sets containing $+\infty$, which is precisely the set of all positive nonfinite hyperreals. ($N^2$ might not lie in the monad of $N$, but AFAIK the same goes for $\epsilon^2$ and $\epsilon$; it's sort of unfair to treat the nonfinite numbers differently in this regard) –  Feb 09 '17 at 04:20
  • That seems to be a point of contention - I learned (and e.g. https://www.math.brown.edu/~ysolomon/NSA.pdf confirms) that the halo of a hyperreal is the set of hyperreals infinitesimally close to it, but it looks like some other sources use the definition you give. I think, given this, that that paragraph is still misleading; it's probably worth saying what a halo is, given that there seem to be multiple definitions. – Noah Schweber Feb 09 '17 at 04:47
  • @Noah: I have the impression the "infinitesimally close" definition comes from sources that are predominantly interested in applying the notion to finite hyperreals, and don't really care how it manifests with infinite hyperreals. When you learned this, did you really use the notion for infinite hyperreals? –  Feb 09 '17 at 05:35
  • (i.e. I had always thought it was a simplified definition for introductory material, rather than a genuinely different convention) –  Feb 09 '17 at 05:43
  • Interesting explanation. It almost sounds like, intuitively, if you are allowed to have infinite zeros followed by infinite arbitrary digits—that is, if you could meaningfully talk about going "halfway to infinity" before non-zero digits appeared in your decimal expression—you would have a hyperreal infinitesimal. Comment? – Wildcard Feb 09 '17 at 07:36
  • @Wildcard : No, that is not possible. However, every infinitesimal number has an infinitely large number of zeros after the decimal dot. Note that infinitely large or i-large is still a finite number, however larger than all standard or appreciable integers. – Lutz Lehmann Feb 09 '17 at 12:40
  • @Hurkyl It looks like you're right - although my recollection is that we did work with halos of infinite hyperreals, looking around at various texts I see that all the "serious" ones define halos as you did. I've deleted my initial comment (which in retrospect was both incorrect and pretty rude), and I'll delete my other comments if you'd like (also, just to clarify, I did upvote this answer). – Noah Schweber Feb 09 '17 at 17:47
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    @Wildcard: Right. In the nonstandard model, we have nonstandard decimal expansions too, whose places are numbered by the hyperintegers. Let $N$ be a hyperinteger that is larger than any standard integer. Then, any decimal expansion that starts with $N$ zeroes to the right of the decimal place, followed by arbitrary digits is, indeed, smaller than $10^{-N}$. This is a perfectly ordinary hyperreal, but when we compare to the standard model it is infinitesimally in size, since it is smaller than any positive standard real number! –  Feb 09 '17 at 17:58
  • Thanks, Hurkyl. That makes sense and aligns with my intuitive explanation in the comment above. I wonder why @LutzL objects. – Wildcard Feb 09 '17 at 21:08
  • @Wildcard : This is the problem with NSA, you have to care for language almost to a lawyer level. You can in no context have $∞$ zeros before the first non-zero digit, but of course $N$ zeros where $N$ is an infinitely large number is possible. – Lutz Lehmann Feb 09 '17 at 21:17
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    'Keisler's book uses the analogy of a microscope. At one level, you're studying the standard reals, and at any time you may pick a real and "zoom in" to look at its halo of nonstandard reals with that standard part.' Are the nonstandard reals here synonymous with hyperreal numbers? – Andreas Feb 09 '17 at 21:41
  • @LutzL: I think at least 80% of the language issue is merely that the technical language is immature (or only known to specialists) -- nearly everybody has spoken ZFC-style sets for the past 100 years so it's had a long time to develop, but NSA has only been spoken for 60 years and has been unpopular for most of that. –  Feb 11 '17 at 01:04
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    @Panthéon: Yes; I am using "hyperreals" synonymously with "the real numbers of the nonstandard model under discussion". –  Feb 11 '17 at 01:07
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I am glad to see from your question here that you are using Keisler's wonderful book on infinitesimal calculus.

We have been using this textbook at our university for the past three years to train about 400 freshmen, an educational experience we have reported on in this recently published article. The results of opinion polls indicate that students overwhelmingly prefer infinitesimal definitions of key concepts of the calculus like continuity, derivative, and convergence. Once the students have understood those key concepts in the intuitive (and rigorous) language of infinitesimals, we also present the epsilon-delta paraphrases of those concepts, so that by the end of the semester the students are ready to enter a follow-up course using either method.

Next year we will be teaching calculus using this approach to an estimated 200 students.

We present the procedures of infinitesimal calculus in a rigorous way. Just as in non-infinitesimal approaches, the construction of advanced number systems is postponed to more advanced courses in analysis.

Besides, the constructions of the real number field $\mathbb R$ and the hyperreal number field ${}^{\ast}\mathbb{R}$ are not that dissimilar. Here $\mathbb R$ can be defined as the quotient of the ring consisting of Cauchy sequences of rational numbers. The kernel in this case is a suitable maximal ideal MAX (namely the ideal of sequences converging to zero). Similarly, ${}^{\ast}\mathbb{R}$ is a quotient of the ring consisting of all sequences of real numbers. The kernel in this case is similarly a suitable maximal ideal MAX. This second MAX is of course different from the first MAX mentioned above, but the point is that the existence of a maximal ideal extending a given one is standard material of an undergraduate algebra course.

In this context, an infinitesimal is generated by the concrete sequence $1,\frac12,\frac13,\ldots$ namely the sequence $(\frac{1}{n})$.

At any rate these theoretical developments don't really affect the practice of freshman calculus.

For those interested in these subtler issues at the research level, I would like to refute the canard that the hyperreals are a more mysterious object than the reals. Namely, in Nelson's axiomatic approach, the infinitesimals are found within the real number line itself. Nelson's approach involves enriching the language of set theory by the introduction of a one-place predicate st$(x)$, which reads "$x$ is standard". In this approach an infinitesimal is a number $\epsilon\in\mathbb{R}$ such that $\neg \text{st}(\epsilon)$ and $\epsilon<r$ for every positive standard real number $r$. In this way, clinging to non-infinitesimal versions of analysis merely amount to a commitment to the details of a particular set-theoretic foundation, specifically designed to exclude infinitesimals.

These issues are explored in more detail in this recent article due to appear in the journal Real Analysis Exchange; no relation to SME :-)

Mikhail Katz
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Some editors feel that in order to understand the hyperreals, a student needs background in algebra, set theory including cardinalities, and analysis. Users with sufficient reputation score can view one such (deleted) answer below.

I feel that Andreas' question should be understood in the context of his interest in learning the calculus following Keisler's textbook Elementary Calculus. So the question practically speaking is whether the infinitesimal approach is a practical way of learning the calculus. One can't expect a student to learn algebra, set theory, and analysis (!) before he learns calculus.

There is a further deeper observation that you might want to take to heart. Edward Nelson developed an original approach to Robinson's infinitesimals. Here instead of extending the real numbers, we enrich the language spoken by set theory by adding a one-place predicate "st" (meaning "standard") together with suitable axioms governing the interaction of "st" with the other set-theoretic axioms. In this approach, infinitesimals are found within the standard real line, as I pointed out in my answer (this was also mentioned in another answer).

From this point of view, requiring a student to learn analysis on $\mathbb R$ before he learns calculus on $\mathbb R$ is particularly paradoxical. What the existence of Nelson's framework reveals is that clinging to the non-infinitesimal way of teaching calculus amounts merely to an apriori commitment to the details of a particular set-theoretic framework at the expense of another.

Mikhail Katz
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  • Would you like to include this text into your first answer? :-) Or which are your reasons to have written two answers? – Andreas Mar 08 '17 at 12:36
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    @AndreasAlmgren, this is mainly a response to the user who posted an answer that contains some interesting points, but then went on to delete it. I feel my answer above deals with a different aspect of the story and should appear separately. – Mikhail Katz Mar 08 '17 at 12:37
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Infinitesimals are not assignable, as the founders of the calculus understood. But this does not mean that infinitesimals are indistinguishable from one another. If x is an infinitesimal that 2x clearly differs from x. In Edward Nelson's Internal Set Theory, infinitesimals reside within the standard real line.

Mikhail Katz
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