It is a special case of something called "vacuous truth", and it makes a lot more sense if you slightly change how you think about $p \implies q$.
For instance, look at the statement
$\forall$ persons$($That person is from Holoshandra$\implies$That person speaks fluently English$)$
You could interpret it litterally, which would make the statement nonsensical, since there is no such place as Holoshandra. I choose to look at it as a promise. The statement can be rephrased into "Show me a person from Holoshandra, and I promise you that he speaks fluent English". That is a promise I am guaranteed to be able to keep (you can't give me a counterexample; there is no one from Holoshandra that doesn't speak English), and thus the statement is considered true.
Also consider the contrapositive:
$\forall$ persons$($That person doesn't speak English$\implies$That person is not from Holoshandra$)$
which is more intuitively obvious, no matter what you mean by $\implies$.