I am thinking about CPA-security for symmetric encryption.
So $A$ gets access to an encryption oracle, and it can keep asking queries (training phase). In this training phase, he asks $m_i$ and receives back $y_i$. He can also check if he can find a key which decrypts to the same message he encrypted, just check if $\Pi.\mathsf{Dec}(k, y_i) = m_i$ for some $k$ that $A$ guesses. He can also do the same thing during the challenge phase and see if the $y^*$ he got back decrypts to either of $m_0,m_1$.
Now I can assume that it's hard to find $k$ (it's chosen uniformly at random), but is it possible to find another key $k'$ that happens to work on some of the training queries? I guess this shouldn't happen with more than negligible probability if $\Pi$ is CPA-secure, but it could happen, right?
My question may be similar to: Is it possible to decrypt a ciphertext with a different private key?