I have read that if the DDH problem could be efficiently solved, the IND-CPA would not hold for ElGamal.
I don't see why it makes ElGamal less secure if you have $g^a$, $g^b$ and $g^c$
I have read that if the DDH problem could be efficiently solved, the IND-CPA would not hold for ElGamal.
I don't see why it makes ElGamal less secure if you have $g^a$, $g^b$ and $g^c$
Let $\mathcal{A}(g^a,g^b,g^c)$ be a DDH adversary which will return 1 if it thinks that $c = ab$, and return 0 if it thinks that $c$ is chosen from random.
Let $a$ is a private key and $g^a$ is a public key, we can attack IND-CPA of ElGamal encryption as follows.
Now we can distinguish between Experiment 0 and Experiment 1 easily.