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By formal proof I mean a finite sequence of strings in the language of ZFC that begins with a subset of the axioms of ZFC and ends with the sentence $\exists x.\forall y.(\forall z.\neg(z\in y)\iff (x=y))$, such that each string is either an axiom or a theorem provable from the axioms and inference rules of FOL - e.g. Hilbert proof, natural deduction, etc. [see edit]. Specifically, I am looking for a proof in the language of ZFC proper, without extending it by the constant symbol "$\emptyset$" (this is why I need to ask - the proof is trivial, otherwise).

I've looked through a couple of repositories for theorem provers, but even these seem to rely on introducing a new symbol to express the empty set.

I assume that the proof exists somewhere, probably in some dusty preprint from 1913, but I haven't been able to find it yet.


Note/Response to comments: I do not doubt the uniqueness of the empty set, nor am I asking for an explanation of the intuition behind a proof of the uniqueness of the empty set. I understand that the axiom of extensionality implies the uniqueness of the empty set. This question is strictly about the formal proof of uniqueness - i.e. which inference rules and axioms must be used and in what order to conclude the uniqueness of the empty set - specifically in the language whose only non-logical symbol is $\in$. To be absolutely, 200% clear, this will, at some point, be read by a machine. Said machine is only intended to recognize the following symbols: $\forall,\exists,\land,\lor,\neg,\implies,\iff,=,(,),.,',\in, x$, and nothing else.

Now, I could brute-force it by systematically applying every inference rule to every axiom, adding the result to the set of axioms and repeating until I get the desired theorem, but 1) that could take days of nonstop running and 2) I really don't want to do that, especially if someone else already did it 100 years ago.

Edit: As it turns out, natural deduction systems [particularly Fitch-style?] and their kin have something that Hilbert systems do not: the ability to introduce new variables through existential instantiation, like so...

$$\dfrac{\exists x.\phi}{\phi(\alpha/ x)}\exists E$$

...provided that $\alpha$ does not occur free in any previous lines.

According to this, these are known as Skolem terms, and they act as "virtual" constants in a proof. This would be used, for instance, in the formalization of the proof sketch in Alex Kruckman's answer (i.e. "let $x$ be such a set"). While these terms cannot appear in the conclusion of a proof, they can appear in premises or "subproofs." This violates the condition that every sentence of the proof be either an axiom or a theorem. Despite its being fundamental to mathematical logic, I was not aware of this detail until yesterday (it wasn't especially relevant until a few days ago).

R. Burton
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2 Answers2

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I think you already know the proof! But I'll write it here in great detail so that the logical structure is clear:

By the empty set axiom, there exists a set with no elements. Let $x$ be such a set. Now let $y$ be an arbitrary set. If $x=y$, then $y$ has no elements. Conversely, if $y$ has no elements, then $x$ and $y$ have the same elements. By the extensionality axiom, $x=y$. Thus, there exists $x$ such that for any $y$, $y$ has no elements if and only if $x=y$.

What remains is an exercise in formalization: translating the above proof into a formal proof. This can, of course, be done - the argument above is relatively simple first-order reasoning, which is fairly straightforward to implement in any standard proof system. But the details will depend on your choice of proof system and specific formulation of the axioms of empty set and extensionality.


Edit: Based on the latest edit to your question and your concern about proofs which introduce a new symbol for the empty set, it seems you're especially caught up on the step of the proof where I say "Let $x$ be such a set" (a set with no elements).

It's a fundamental feature of first-order reasoning that if we can prove an existential statement, then we can name a witness by a variable and use it in further reasoning. In informal proofs, this is often realized by the ubiquitous phrase "Let $x$ be ..." In formal proofs systems, this form of reasoning is implemented in various ways, but it is always present.

The "$\exists E$" rule in your post is one such implementation. I share your distaste for proof systems containing the rule in this form, but this is not the only way to go, even in natural deduction systems - see my comments here.

In a Hilbert system, we would instead have $\exists x \varphi\rightarrow ((\forall x(\varphi\rightarrow \psi))\rightarrow \psi)$, where $x$ does not occur free in $\psi$. Depending on how your Hilbert system handles quantifiers, this might be an axiom or just derivable - see the posted I linked to in the previous paragraph for a derivation in one particular Hilbert system. But the point is that it captures the same pattern of reasoning discussed above: Suppose we can prove $\exists x\varphi$. Now assume $\varphi$ (and note that $x$ is now a free variable naming the witness to the quantifier) and prove $\psi$ in which $x$ is not free. By the deduction theorem, $(\varphi\rightarrow \psi)$, and by generalization $\forall x(\varphi\rightarrow \psi)$. By our axiom and modus ponens twice, we have $\psi$.

Edit 2: Below, I've written a natural deduction proof of the uniqueness of the empty set. If anything is not clear, let me know.

\begin{align*} (1) &\quad \exists x \forall z (\lnot z\in x) &\quad (\textbf{Empty set})\\ (2) &\quad\quad \forall z(\lnot z\in x) & \quad (\text{Assumption})\\ (3) &\quad\quad\quad x = y & \quad (\text{Assumption})\\ (4) &\quad\quad\quad \forall z(\lnot z\in y) & \quad (= E: 2, 3)\\ (5) &\quad\quad (x = y)\rightarrow \forall z(\lnot z\in y) & \quad (\rightarrow I: 3-4)\\ (6) &\quad\quad\quad \forall z(\lnot z\in y) &\quad (\text{Assumption})\\ (7) & \quad\quad\quad \lnot z\in y &\quad (\forall E: 6)\\ (8) &\quad\quad\quad\quad z\in y &\quad (\text{Assumption})\\ (9) &\quad \quad\quad\quad z\in x &\quad (\lnot E: 7,8)\\ (10) &\quad\quad\quad (z\in y)\rightarrow (z\in x) &\quad (\rightarrow I: 8-9)\\ (11) & \quad\quad\quad \lnot z\in x &\quad (\forall E: 2)\\ (12) &\quad\quad\quad\quad z\in x &\quad (\text{Assumption})\\ (13) &\quad \quad\quad\quad z\in y &\quad (\lnot E: 11,12)\\ (14) &\quad\quad\quad (z\in x)\rightarrow (z\in y) &\quad (\rightarrow I: 12-13)\\ (15) &\quad\quad\quad (z\in x)\leftrightarrow (z\in y) &\quad (\leftrightarrow I: 10, 14)\\ (16) &\quad\quad\quad \forall z( (z\in x)\leftrightarrow (z\in y)) &\quad (\forall I: 15)\\ (17) &\quad\quad\quad \forall x\forall y(\forall z( (z\in x)\leftrightarrow (z\in y))\rightarrow (x=y))& \quad(\textbf{Extensionality})\\ (18) &\quad\quad\quad \forall y(\forall z( (z\in x)\leftrightarrow (z\in y))\rightarrow (x=y))& \quad(\forall E: 15)\\ (19) &\quad\quad\quad \forall z( (z\in x)\leftrightarrow (z\in y))\rightarrow (x=y)& \quad(\forall E: 16)\\ (20) & \quad\quad\quad x = y & \quad (\rightarrow E: 16, 19)\\ (21) & \quad\quad \forall z (\lnot z\in y)\rightarrow (x = y) &\quad (\rightarrow I: 6-20)\\ (22) & \quad\quad \forall z(\lnot z\in y)\leftrightarrow (x=y) &\quad (\leftrightarrow I: 5, 21)\\ (23) & \quad\quad \forall y(\forall z(\lnot z\in y)\leftrightarrow (x=y)) &\quad (\forall I: 22)\\ (24) & \quad\quad \exists x\forall y(\forall z(\lnot z\in y)\leftrightarrow (x=y)) &\quad (\exists I: 23)\\ (25) & \quad \exists x\forall y(\forall z(\lnot z\in y)\leftrightarrow (x=y)) &\quad (\exists E: 1, 2-24)\\ \end{align*}

Alex Kruckman
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  • What is my motivation ? Well, 1) The gory details are what separates my belief that the empty set is unique from the fact that it is (or rather, that ZFC proves it is, since there is no "actual" empty set to speak of). – R. Burton Oct 19 '20 at 15:29
  • Until yesterday I mistakenly thought that I could readily convert ND proofs to Hilbert proofs and vice-versa. In actuality, the requirement that "each string is an axiom or theorem" means that I am looking for Hilbert proof (or something close to it). However, I regularly treat metatheorems like inference rules, so my idea of a Hilbert proof looks like an ND proof - hence the confusion. I will edit the question to reflect this.
  • – R. Burton Oct 19 '20 at 15:30
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  • Formalization is the part I'm struggling with. Having a solid reference gives me a starting point to say "okay, this one way to do that." 4) As a long time lover of death metal, I delight in the chance to make anything "gory." Details are no exception.
  • – R. Burton Oct 19 '20 at 15:32
  • @R.Burton Fair enough! I've edited my answer. Hopefully this gives you a bit more insight about how to convert natural deduction proofs to Hilbert proofs. – Alex Kruckman Oct 23 '20 at 02:49
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    @R.Burton And now I've added a formal proof (in natural deduction, because Hilbert proofs are terrible). – Alex Kruckman Oct 23 '20 at 18:44
  • Thanks, the proof looks good! I'll probably ask this as a separate question, but just in case there's an easy answer - is there an effective procedure which, given an ND proof with premises $\Gamma$ and conclusion $\varphi$, produces a Hilbert proof of the same? – R. Burton Oct 24 '20 at 14:37
  • @R.Burton Yes - you have to prove a meta theorem for each ND rule, showing it is derivable in your Hilbert system. E.g. the $\rightarrow$ introduction rule is the "deduction theorem". Any reasonable way of doing these proofs will give an algorithm for transforming an ND proof to a Hilbert proof. – Alex Kruckman Oct 24 '20 at 18:08
  • Well that would be the case if every inference rule of ND were a metatheorem of HS, but we've already established that there are inference rules which aren't. Even $\forall E$ that you use in you're proof can't be implemented (directly) in HS - at least not without introducing new constants to the language. – R. Burton Oct 26 '20 at 14:20
  • @R.Burton I just read your last comment more carefully. Of course $\forall E$ is derivable in HS - because it is sound! The completeness theorem for a proof system says that all sound rules are derivable. Since the definition of soundness does not refer to the proof system, any two complete proof systems (like ND and HS) will derive the same rules. – Alex Kruckman Oct 26 '20 at 15:16
  • In the case of $\forall E$, it's particularly easy to derive: HS has an axiom $(\forall x \varphi)\rightarrow \varphi[x/t]$ where $t$ is any term substitutable for $x$ in $\varphi$ and $\varphi[x/t]$ is the result of the substitution (it is called Q5 on the Wikipedia page for "Hilbert system"). By modus ponens, from the hypothesis $\forall x\varphi$, we can conclude $\varphi[x/t]$. This is exactly the ND rule $\forall E$. (And note we can take $t=x$ itself, as I do in the proof.) – Alex Kruckman Oct 26 '20 at 15:20
  • I've only seen this when $t$ is a non-variable term. For example $\forall x. (x=0)\lor (0<x)\vdash (SSS0=0)\lor (0<SSS0)$ in PA. It would make little sense to derive $(x=0)\lor (0<x)$ by itself, because the theorems of PA do not contain free variables. Unlike PA, ZF does not provide us with an explicit means of constructing new (non-variable) terms, so applying $\forall E$ sans extension by constants will always yield a non-theorem. – R. Burton Oct 26 '20 at 15:50
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    @R.Burton Well, you're wrong about this. There is no such restriction on variables in this axiom. The Hilbert system can prove theorems which contain free variables - the interpretation is that these variables are implicitly universally quantified. This is one of the reasons I don't like Hilbert systems - but it's a fact of life. – Alex Kruckman Oct 26 '20 at 16:02
  • I'm not sure about this. Suppose that free variables are "implicitly universally quantified." Shouldn't the theory with axiom schemas $\varphi_1(\overline{x}_1),\ldots,\varphi_n(\overline{x}_n)$ be equivalent to one with axioms $\forall \overline{x}_1.\varphi_1(\overline{x}_1),\ldots,\forall\overline{x}_n.\varphi(\overline{x}_n)$? But then Robinson arithmetic would be equivalent to Smith's "baby arithmetic" (we can infer the axiom $(y=0)\lor\exists x(Sx = y)$ from $(y=0)\lor (Sa=y)$ for some $a$, which can be found by a bounded search). But "baby arithmetic" is complete so...? – R. Burton Oct 27 '20 at 13:19
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    @R.Burton I've never heard of Smith's baby arithmetic, so I can't comment on that. I'm just telling you what I know to be true about Hilbert systems. If you're still confused about it, please ask a new question. – Alex Kruckman Oct 27 '20 at 13:39
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    It seems Smith's baby arithmetic doesn't allow variables at all (quantified or not), so I don't see how it could be relevant to this discussion. – Alex Kruckman Oct 27 '20 at 15:02